

# Social Interactions in Job Satisfaction

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
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# Social Interactions in Job Satisfaction\*

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## Abstract

The literature documents that job satisfaction is positively correlated with worker performance and productivity. We examine whether aggregate job satisfaction in a certain labor market environment can have an impact on individual-level job satisfaction. If the answer is yes, then policies targeted to increase job satisfaction can increase productivity not only directly, but through spillover externalities too. We seek an answer to this question using two different data sets from the United Kingdom characterizing two different labor market environments: Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS) at the workplace level (i.e., narrowly defined worker groups) and British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) at the local labor market level (i.e., larger worker groups defined in industry  $\times$  region cells). Implementing an original empirical strategy to identify spillover effects, we find that one standard deviation increase in aggregate job satisfaction leads to a 0.42 standard deviation increase in individual-level job satisfaction at the workplace level and 0.15 standard deviation increase in individual-level job satisfaction at the local labor market level. These social interactions effects are sizable and should not be ignored in assessing the effectiveness of the policies designed to improve job satisfaction.

*JEL codes:* C31, D62, J28.

*Keywords:* Job satisfaction; social interactions; spillovers; hierarchical model; WERS; BHPS.

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# 1 Introduction

Job satisfaction is a direct measure of utility an employed worker derives from his/her current job [Clark and Oswald (1996)]. It has extensive behavioral consequences. For example, job satisfaction is a significant determinant of labor market mobility—in particular, the quitting behavior.<sup>1</sup> It is also shown to be related to relative pay comparisons among peer groups in the workplace.<sup>2</sup> Most importantly, and this is mainly why labor economists should be interested in job satisfaction, it is documented to have a positive correlation with labor productivity and worker performance.<sup>3</sup> In particular, Boeckerman and Ilmakunnas (2012) document that job satisfaction has a causal effect on productivity.<sup>4</sup> To get the feel of the magnitude, Boeckerman and Ilmakunnas (2012) find that one standard deviation increase in job satisfaction within the plant increases productivity per hours worked by 6.6 percent.

Although several aspects of job satisfaction have been studied extensively in the empirical literature, whether there exist spillover externalities in job satisfaction—i.e., whether individual-level job satisfaction is affected by the aggregate job satisfaction in a certain labor market environment—or not remains as an unanswered question. This is a relevant question because job satisfaction is often associated with workplace attitudes such as involvement in the organization, relatedness with co-workers/customers/managers, attachment, motivation, shirking, tendency to slow down work, absenteeism, etc. These attitudes form a workplace “atmosphere” and jointly contribute to the formation of worker satisfaction and performance. Therefore, the aggregate job satisfaction level in a certain work environment can be regarded as a “social” variable and may, in turn, affect individual-level job satisfaction.

Our ultimate goal in this paper is to investigate if there exist any visible footprints of social interactions in job satisfaction. Answering this question is also important for policy. If there

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<sup>1</sup>See, e.g., Freeman (1978), Akerlof et al. (1988), Clark et al. (1998), and Clark (2001).

<sup>2</sup>See, for example, Clark et al. (2009) and Card et al. (2012).

<sup>3</sup>Other studies documenting this positive relationship include, but are not limited to, Iaffaldano and Muchinsky (1985), Ostroff (1992), Brown and Peterson (1994), Ryan et al. (1996), Sloane and Williams (2000), Argyle (2001), Judge et al. (2001), Harter et al. (2002), Schneider et al. (2003), Patterson et al. (2004), Green and Tsitsianis (2005), Otis and Pelletier (2005), Christen et al. (2006), Ghinetti (2007), and Wegge et al. (2007). Zelenski et al. (2008) and Oswald et al. (2013) argue that happiness and life satisfaction are also positively correlated with productivity.

<sup>4</sup>The direction of the causal relationship between productivity and job satisfaction has been controversial in the literature. However, recent evidence suggests that the direction of the relationship goes from job satisfaction to labor productivity.

exist positive spillovers in job satisfaction, then policies targeted to increase job satisfaction can boost productivity not only directly, but through spillover externalities too. When these social interactions effects are sizable, ignoring them may lead to mis-assessment of the effectiveness of the policies designed to improve job satisfaction in various work environments.

We perform our empirical analysis at two aggregation levels using two different data sets from the United Kingdom. *First*, we use the Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS) to test the existence of job satisfaction spillovers at the workplace level (or establishment-level).<sup>5</sup> In the workplace-level analysis, the reference group that the social forces are effective is the set of workers in each workplace. *Second*, we use the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) to form industry  $\times$  region cells for the purpose of testing the existence of spillovers at the local labor market level. In this second exercise, we try to capture more general social effects in larger reference groups. The main purpose is to focus on social processes that involve collective aspects of community and work life. In both of these exercises, we concentrate on estimating the correlation between the group-level and individual-level job satisfaction scores, controlling for a large set of observed covariates. Drawing a distinction between the workplace and local labor market level analyses is useful, because it will allow us to make precise statements on whether it is more effective to enforce job satisfaction policies at the establishment level (i.e., as firm-specific policies) or local labor market level (i.e., in the form of broader institutional measures).

Our econometric framework will be a version of the canonical linear-in-means model, which is a base for the bulk of empirical work on social interactions.<sup>6</sup> The main problem with the linear-in-means model is that it necessitates employing a carefully-designed identification strategy to separate endogenous effects from the contextual effects [Manski (1993)]. It will perhaps be useful at this point to clearly define the terms “endogenous social effects” and “contextual social effects.”<sup>7</sup> The endogenous effect refers to the effect of the group-level outcome on the

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<sup>5</sup>The terms “workplace” and “establishment” will be used interchangeably throughout the paper.

<sup>6</sup>See Blume et al. (2011) for an in-depth background information on linear-in-means models, including a comprehensive discussion on micro-foundations and econometric identification. Also see Blume and Durlauf (2001), Brock and Durlauf (2001b), and Soetevenet (2006).

<sup>7</sup>See also Manski (2000) and Brock and Durlauf (2001b) for a more detailed discussion of the different types of social interactions effects.

individual-level outcome. Within the context of our paper, this corresponds to the effect of the group-level mean of job satisfaction on the individual-level job satisfaction. The contextual effect, on the other hand, refers to the effect of the group-level counterparts of the individual-level observables on the individual-level outcome variable; in our paper, this corresponds to the effect of, say, group-level average age or average education on the individual-level job satisfaction score.

At the center of our identification strategy lies an insight from the hierarchical (or multilevel) statistical models of social processes: social groups describe “ecologies” in which decisions are made and matter because different ecologies induce different mappings from the individual determinants of these decisions to the associated outcomes [[Raudenbush and Sampson \(1999\)](#)]. Based on this conceptualization, we construct an empirical model in which contextual effects (i.e., the “ecologies” in our model) alter the coefficients linking individual characteristics to outcomes. This corresponds to allowing for multiplicative interactions between the contextual effects and the remaining explanatory terms within the linear-in-means model. We formally show that introducing these cross-product terms induces non-linearities that resolve the reflection problem [Manski \(1993\)](#) describes [see Section 3]. Such a setup secures the econometric identification of social interactions and enables us to separate endogenous effects from the contextual effects [[Blume and Durlauf \(2005\)](#)]. Although, this approach is rather simple and intuitive, it is surprisingly under-utilized in the literature.

There are two more potential threats to identification. The first one is the possibility of sorting into reference groups based on unobserved factors [[Manski \(1993\)](#)]. More specifically, if there exist group-level unobserved factors that determine individual-level job satisfaction and are also correlated with the group-level job satisfaction, then the resulting estimates would be biased. Our empirical approach also allows us to address this problem, at least partially, by controlling for group-level unobservables in various ways. And, second, it is well-documented in the literature that the relative income structure within the reference group is an important determinant of the job satisfaction level in the peer group [[Card et al. \(2012\)](#)]. We also control for the pay-comparison effects in our calculations.

We find that one standard deviation increase in aggregate job satisfaction level leads to a 0.42 standard deviation increase in individual-level job satisfaction score at the workplace level and a 0.15 standard deviation increase in individual-level job satisfaction score at the local labor market level. In other words, we report that statistically significant job satisfaction spillovers exist both at the establishment level and local labor market level; and, the estimated spillovers are approximately three times larger at the establishment level than those at the local labor market level. These estimates can be restated in terms of the social multiplier: the corresponding social multipliers are  $[1/(1 - 0.42) \approx] 1.72$  and  $[1/(1 - 0.15) \approx] 1.18$  at the workplace and local labor market levels, respectively.<sup>8</sup> Simple calculations yield the result that the [Boeckerman and Ilmakunnas \(2012\)](#) estimates—which say that one standard deviation increase in job satisfaction within the plant increases productivity per hours worked by 6.6 percent—would be revised up to 11.4 percent at the workplace level and 7.8 percent at the local labor market level after accounting for the job satisfaction spillovers. To summarize, these results suggest that (1) failing to account for the spillover externalities in job satisfaction may lead us to mis-assess the effectiveness of job satisfaction policies; thus, the policy maker should internalize these externalities, and (2) job satisfaction spillovers are much stronger at the workplace level than local labor market level; therefore, designing/enforcing job satisfaction policies at the workplace level will likely be more effective than implementing such policies at the local labor market level.

We also report estimates for contextual social effects. At the workplace level, we find that individual-level job satisfaction goes up with the fraction of male and older workers in the workplace. At the local labor market level, however, gender and age do not have any statistically significant contextual effect; instead, we only find that individual-level job satisfaction score goes down as the fraction of workers with greater access to promotion opportunities goes up in each industry  $\times$  region cell. We also document that there are significant “income comparison effects” at the workplace, but not at the local labor market. In particular, we find that individual-level job satisfaction goes down with (*i*) average earnings and (*ii*) fraction of high earners—i.e., those who earn above the median wage within the relevant worker

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<sup>8</sup>See [Glaeser et al. \(2003\)](#) for an excellent discussion of the social multiplier concept.

population—in the workplace. We discuss these results further in Section 5, where we also present detailed robustness exercises to prove that our estimates are not excessively sensitive to relaxing some of the main assumptions behind the empirical model.

The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 relates and compares our work to the relevant papers in the literature. Section 3 explains the details of the econometric model and the identification strategy we employ. Section 4 provides an overview of the data sets we use and justifies the construction of our reference groups in different work settings. Section 5 presents the estimates, discusses in detail the results, performs robustness checks, and elaborates on the policy implications. Section 6 concludes.

## 2 Related Literature

Our paper can be placed into the literature investigating social interactions in labor markets. There is a large body of literature testing the existence of peer effects in various labor market outcomes including productivity, wages, absenteeism, and learning (or knowledge spillovers). The results are mixed. For example, using grocery scanner data from a large supermarket chain, [Mas and Moretti \(2009\)](#) perform a field experiment among low-wage earners to analyze if the individual-level effort is influenced by a permanent increase in the productivity of co-workers and find reasonably large peer effects. [Falk and Ichino \(2006\)](#) study the behavior of high school students performing a simple task in a laboratory experiment to understand if individual-level performances are directly affected by the existence of other individuals doing the same task and they also document moderate peer effects. [Ichino and Maggi \(2000\)](#) find that group-level peer absenteeism increases individual absenteeism. In a field study, [Bandiera et al. \(2009\)](#) find that individual-level productivity responds to the skill-level of a friend working nearby, but does not respond to the skill-level of a non-friend working around. [Guryan et al. \(2009\)](#), on the other hand, find employing a random assignment exercise on a golf tournament data that individual-level performance is not influenced by the playing partners' ability. [Cornelissen et al. \(2013\)](#) report only small peer effects in wages among co-workers.<sup>9</sup> While

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<sup>9</sup>Here, “peer effects in wages” refer to the idea that peer-induced productivity increases could be rewarded in the form of higher wages.

[Azoulay et al. \(2010\)](#) and [Jackson and Bruegmann \(2009\)](#) document significant knowledge spillovers among co-workers, [Waldinger \(2012\)](#) shows that those spillovers are weak, if they ever exist.

There are also several papers investigating contagion effects in subjective well-being measures. Using Chinese rural survey data, [Knight and Gunatilaka \(2009\)](#) examine whether happiness is infectious or not at the village level. Their results show that happiness is infectious in narrowly-defined reference groups. They exploit the panel feature of their data set to remove the reflection problem and identify the relevant social effects. Papers in the psychology literature also find that happiness might be contagious in small environments.<sup>10</sup> However, these studies do not address the reflection problem, which might bias the results. [Tumen and Zeydanli \(2014\)](#), on the other hand, find that these contagion effects might disappear in more broadly defined reference groups.

Our paper differs from this body of work and contributes to the related literature in three ways. First, this is the first paper in the literature estimating spillover effects in job satisfaction. We show that there exist statistically and economically significant job satisfaction spillovers in various work environments. Second, we show that the degree of these spillover externalities may change at different aggregation levels. Using two different data sets from the United Kingdom, we construct our reference groups at two aggregation levels: workplace level and local labor market level. The former defines peer effects in narrowly defined work settings, while the latter defines the social environment in larger ecological settings that embed more general aspects of community and working life. We document that the job satisfaction spillovers exist in both environments; but, they are much stronger at the workplace level than local labor market level. We further argue that this may have important policy implications. And, third, motivated by the hierarchical models of social processes, we develop an original identification strategy to separate endogenous effects from the contextual effects, controlling for group-level unobserved heterogeneity.

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<sup>10</sup>See, e.g., [Hatfield et al. \(1994\)](#), [Sato and Yoshikawa \(2007\)](#), and [Fowler and Christakis \(2008\)](#).

There are also several papers criticizing the empirical literature on peer effects.<sup>11</sup> In particular, [Angrist \(2014\)](#) has pointed out that many papers in the literature falsely interpret the observed correlations between individual- and group-level outcomes as causal relationships. He argues that the instrumental variable (IV) estimates reported in this literature “often ... produce findings that look like a peer effect, even in a world where behavioral influences between peers are absent.” In this paper, we do not use the IV approach; instead, we rely on a non-linear model of social interactions—which is motivated by hierarchical statistical models—to obtain econometric identification. The non-linear models are not free of problems, either. The most common criticism is that, most of the time, the non-linear structure used to identify peer effects is hard to justify. The non-linear specification that we use in this paper has two appealing features. First, the non-linearity is simply obtained by including certain interaction terms between the regressors of a standard linear-in-means model. The use of interaction terms is quite common in regression analysis and are never regarded as strange or unjustified. Second, the inclusion of interaction terms into linear-in-means models is theoretically justified by the “social ecologies” viewpoint in a strand of the sociology literature.<sup>12</sup> See [Raudenbush and Sampson \(1999\)](#) and [Blume and Durlauf \(2005\)](#) for further motivation and references. Next, we present the details of our non-linear model of social interactions and describe our identification strategy.

### 3 Model and Theoretical Background

The econometric framework that we employ in this paper is a version of the canonical linear-in-means model of social interactions. Our ultimate goal is to estimate social interactions in job satisfaction. In particular, we would like to estimate the effects of (1) group-level job satisfaction—the “endogenous social effect”—and (2) group-level exogenous characteristics—the “contextual effects”—on individual-level job satisfaction, controlling for group-level heterogeneity. The linear-in-means model of social interactions is plagued with the well-known “reflection problem,” which masks the econometric identification of social interactions [[Man-](#)

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<sup>11</sup>See, e.g., [Deaton \(1990\)](#), [Moffitt \(2001\)](#), and [Angrist \(2014\)](#).

<sup>12</sup>The origins of the term “social ecologies” or “ecological settings” goes back to the Chicago School of Sociology in the 1920s [see, e.g., [Cavan \(1983\)](#)].

ski (1993)]. The simplest way to resolve this issue is to use an appropriately formulated instrumental variables strategy. When an instrument is not available, it is necessary to invoke non-linearities to identify social interactions [Brock and Durlauf (2001a), Blume et al. (2011)].

In this paper, we use an empirical strategy that allows us to convert the standard linear model into a nonlinear one. The motivation comes from the hierarchical models of social processes. This hierarchical structure secures identification of social interactions via introducing cross-product terms into the standard model. This section provides a detailed description of our econometric model for the purpose of familiarizing the reader with the basic concepts we frequently mention throughout the paper. Section 3.1 presents our empirical model and the associated technical issues (i.e., the reflection problem) including a formal statement of the conditions required to identify social interactions. Section 3.2 describes our hierarchical model and assesses in detail how we achieve identification.

### 3.1 The Empirical Model of Social Interactions

Each individual  $i \in \mathcal{I}$  is a member of a group  $g \in \mathcal{G}$ , where  $\mathcal{I}$  is the number of individuals in the worker population and  $\mathcal{G}$  is the number of groups, with  $\mathcal{I} > \mathcal{G}$ . The following linear-in-means equation is an empirical tool commonly used in the literature:

$$\omega_{i_g} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \mathbf{X}_{i_g} + \beta_2 \mathbf{Y}_g + Jm_g + u_g + \epsilon_{i_g}, \quad (3.1)$$

where the dependent variable,  $\omega_{i_g}$ , is the individual-level job satisfaction for person  $i$  in group  $g$ ,  $\mathbf{X}_{i_g}$  is a vector of individual-level observed characteristics of  $i$  in group  $g$ ,  $\mathbf{Y}_g$  is a vector of group-level observed characteristics of group  $g$ ,  $m_g = \mathbb{E}[\omega_{i_g}|g, F_{i_g}]$  is the mean job satisfaction in group  $g$ ,  $u_g$  is a group-level unobserved factor common across the members of group  $g$ , and  $\epsilon_{i_g}$  is a random error term with  $\mathbb{E}[\epsilon_{i_g}|g, F_{i_g}] = 0$ . In our notation,  $F_{i_g}$  corresponds to the empirical distribution of individuals in group  $g$  and this distribution is possibly different for each group. The distinction between  $\beta_2$  (contextual effects) and  $J$  (endogenous effect) is the key notion in this model. The former measures the effect of exogenous group-level variables on the individual-level outcome, while the latter measures the effect of endogenous group-level

outcome on the individual-level outcome. Our ultimate goal is to clearly distinguish  $\beta_2$  from  $J$  and to separately identify the effects of group-level variables on the individual-level outcome. However, econometric identification is a problematic issue in this standard setting. In what follows, we shut down the group-level unobserved effect  $u_g$  for notational simplicity. It will reappear in our final equation.

To define the identification problem, we take the conditional mathematical expectations of both sides of the linear-in-means equation, where the conditioning is on  $g$  and  $F_{i_g}$ , for all  $i$  and  $g$ . This gives us

$$m_g = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \mathbf{X}_g + \beta_2 \mathbf{Y}_g + J m_g, \quad (3.2)$$

where  $\mathbf{X}_g = \mathbb{E}[\mathbf{X}_{i_g}|g, F_{i_g}]$ .  $\mathbf{X}_g$  can be named as the group-level mean of individual-level observed characteristics and it may or may not coincide with  $\mathbf{Y}_g$ . Notice that  $m_g$  appears in both sides of Equation (3.2). Solving for  $m_g$  yields the result that

$$m_g = \frac{\beta_0}{1 - J} + \frac{\beta_1}{1 - J} \mathbf{X}_g + \frac{\beta_2}{1 - J} \mathbf{Y}_g. \quad (3.3)$$

The reflection problem states that if the dimensions of the vectors  $\mathbf{X}_g$  and  $\mathbf{Y}_g$  are the same, then linearity masks the econometric identification of the (endogenous) social interactions parameter  $J$ .

To formalize this statement, we plug Equation (3.3) into Equation (3.1), which gives us the estimating equation

$$\omega_{i_g} = \frac{\beta_0}{1 - J} + \beta_1 \mathbf{X}_{i_g} + \frac{J\beta_1}{1 - J} \mathbf{X}_g + \frac{\beta_2}{1 - J} \mathbf{Y}_g + \epsilon_{i_g}. \quad (3.4)$$

When the reflection problem is in effect,  $J$  and  $\beta_2$  cannot be distinguished from each other, which implies that social interactions cannot be identified. To see this, set  $\mathbf{X}_g = \mathbf{Y}_g$ , which

yields the equation

$$\omega_{i_g} = \frac{\beta_0}{1 - J} + \beta_1 \mathbf{X}_{i_g} + \frac{J\beta_1 + \beta_2}{1 - J} \mathbf{Y}_g + \epsilon_{i_g}. \quad (3.5)$$

It is obvious that, in this equation, it is impossible to separate  $J$  from  $\beta_2$  econometrically. One solution is the existence of an additional  $X_g$  which is not in  $\mathbf{Y}_g$ . If such an  $X_g$  exists, then endogenous social interactions ( $J$ )—and also all the other model parameters—are identified by applying simple ordinary least-squares method on Equation (3.4). In other words, one individual-level variable, the mean of which cannot be regarded as a group-level variable, is required for identification of social interactions.

Unfortunately, most of the large data sets—such as BHPS, GSOEP, WERS, etc.—do not include a variable  $X_g$  that can naturally fit into the IV definition provided above. One popular alternative to IV is to introduce non-linearities into the linear-in-means specification. To demonstrate how non-linearities secure identification, we modify the standard model as follows:

$$\omega_{i_g} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \mathbf{X}_{i_g} + \beta_2 \mathbf{Y}_g + J\phi(m_g) + \epsilon_{i_g}, \quad (3.6)$$

where  $\phi(\cdot)$  has non-zero second derivatives; that is, it is a legitimate nonlinear function. Without loss of generality, we assume also that  $\phi(\cdot)$  is invertible. Again, taking the conditional mathematical expectations of both sides and rearranging the terms in such a way that the terms with  $m_g$  appears on the left and the rest of the variables on the right, we get the equation

$$\Phi(m_g) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \mathbf{X}_g + \beta_2 \mathbf{Y}_g, \quad (3.7)$$

where  $\Phi(m_g) = m_g - J\phi(m_g)$ . The functions  $\phi(\cdot)$  and  $\Phi(\cdot)$  has the same properties, therefore we can invert  $\Phi(\cdot)$  to get

$$m_g = \Phi^{-1}(\beta_0 + \beta_1 \mathbf{X}_g + \beta_2 \mathbf{Y}_g) \quad (3.8)$$

and plugging this into the original estimating equation we get

$$\omega_{i_g} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \mathbf{X}_{i_g} + \beta_2 \mathbf{Y}_g + J\phi [\Phi^{-1}(\beta_0 + \beta_1 \mathbf{X}_g + \beta_2 \mathbf{Y}_g)] + \epsilon_{i_g}. \quad (3.9)$$

In such a setting, we can identify  $\beta_2$  and  $J$  separately without a further need for an exclusion restriction (or an IV). One problem with this framework is that there is no systematic way of choosing the functional form of  $\phi(\cdot)$ . In this paper, we propose an estimation strategy that introduces a systematic way to embed non-linearities into the standard empirical specification. To be specific, we construct a hierarchical model, which has the additional advantage of being consistent with our definition and conceptualization of social interactions in job satisfaction.

### 3.2 The Hierarchical Model

Suppose that the Equation (3.1) is modified as follows:

$$\omega_{i_g} = \alpha_0(\mathbf{Y}_g) + \alpha_1(\mathbf{Y}_g) \mathbf{X}_{i_g} + \alpha_J(\mathbf{Y}_g) m_g + u_g + \epsilon_{i_g}. \quad (3.10)$$

In words, the coefficients  $\alpha_0$ ,  $\alpha_1$ , and  $\alpha_J$  are stated as functions of the contextual variables,  $\mathbf{Y}_g$ , which define the “social context.” In other words, the contextual variables describe the properties of the environments that the individuals live in. Setting up the regression coefficients in this way implies that social groups describe ecologies in which decisions are made and matter because different ecologies induce different mappings from the individual determinants of these behaviors and choices.<sup>13</sup> To convert this setting into an empirical equation that we can estimate, we make the following simplifying assumptions:

$$\alpha_0(\mathbf{Y}_g) = \beta_0 + \beta_2 \mathbf{Y}_g,$$

$$\alpha_1(\mathbf{Y}_g) = \beta_1 + \mathbf{b} \mathbf{Y}_g,$$

$$\alpha_J(\mathbf{Y}_g) = J + \pi \mathbf{Y}_g.$$

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<sup>13</sup>As an example, suppose that we have two contextual variables in a workplace environment: age and gender. In such a case, whether the environment is dominated by young versus old workers or female versus male workers or not really matters. In other words, the determinants of job satisfaction will depend on the “atmosphere” formed by these team or group attitudes.

Plugging these expressions into Equation (3.10) yields

$$\omega_{i_g} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \mathbf{X}_{i_g} + \beta_2 \mathbf{Y}_g + Jm_g + \pi \mathbf{Y}_g m_g + \mathbf{Y}'_g \mathbf{B} \mathbf{X}_{i_g} + u_g + \epsilon_{i_g}, \quad (3.11)$$

where  $\mathbf{B}$  is the matrix form of the coefficient vector  $\mathbf{b}$ . This equation looks very similar to our original linear-in-means specification except that we include interaction terms in the form of cross products motivated by the hierarchical model.

Note that the nature of the unobserved group-level effect  $u_g$  is a crucial issue. There are two alternatives: random effects versus fixed effects. If the true unobserved group-level effect can be controlled for up to a random error term, then a common way to resolve this issue is to assume that  $u_g$  is itself random rather than fixed. Assuming that  $u_g$  is random is equivalent to saying that it is uncorrelated with the regressors. However, group-level unobserved factors can easily be argued to be correlated with, say, group-level job satisfaction. When this is the case, not being able to control group fixed effects will yield erroneous results. In our baseline analysis, we assume that  $u_g$  is a random term. We then relax this assumption and control for group-level fixed effects to check if the results differ [see Section 5]. We also cluster standard errors at the group level, which means that we account for within-group correlations in the error structure.

To demonstrate how this model is identified, we take the conditional mathematical expectations of both sides, as before, and solve the resulting equation for  $m_g$ , which gives us

$$m_g = \frac{\beta_0 + \beta_1 \mathbf{X}_g + \beta_2 \mathbf{Y}_g + \mathbf{Y}'_g \mathbf{B} \mathbf{X}_g}{1 - J - \pi \mathbf{Y}_g}. \quad (3.12)$$

Notice that, very similar to the motivation behind the nonlinear model, this model also introduces non-linearity between  $m_g$  and the other regressors, even when  $\mathbf{X}_g = \mathbf{Y}_g$ . There is no need for an exclusion restriction and econometric identification of social influences is immediate, given standard conditions on individual- and group-level observed covariates [see [Blume and Durlauf \(2005\)](#) for further details]. This formulation is consistent with our hypothesis and our definition of social interactions.

At the end, we estimate Equation (3.11) to separately identify  $\beta_2$  and  $J$ . In this setup, the endogenous social effect is  $J + \pi \bar{Y}_g$ , where  $\bar{Y}_g$  are the sample means of group-level variables, i.e., the endogenous effect is no more  $J$  since we have cross-product terms in the regressions. The same logic applies to the contextual effects we estimate. The estimates we report and discuss in Section 5 directly refer to these “marginal effects.”

## 4 Data and Reference Groups

In this section, we provide a detailed description of the two data sets we use in our empirical analysis: Workplace Employment Relations Survey and British Household Panel Survey. Both of these surveys are nationally representative data sets for the United Kingdom and provide establishment-level and individual-level labor market information, respectively. We also describe in detail the construction of our reference groups for both of these data sets. We focus on the 2004 editions of both data sets.

### 4.1 Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS)

WERS is a national survey of British employees constructed for the purpose of collecting information on employment relations in Britain.<sup>14</sup> The survey provides information about workers, working conditions, and industrial relations from all sectors except primary industries and private households with domestic staff. WERS 2004—the version that we use in our analysis—is the fifth among a series of surveys. Previous surveys are conducted in 1980, 1984, 1990, and 1998. In the 2004 cross-section, there are around 2,300 workplaces, 1,000 employee representatives, and 22,500 employees.

We construct the job satisfaction scores using the following seven question in the WERS-2004 data set. How satisfied are you with

- 1) the sense of achievement you get from work?
- 2) the scope for using your own initiative?

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<sup>14</sup>The most recent version of this data set has been co-sponsored by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), Acas, the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), the UK Commission for Employment and Skills (UKCES), and the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR).

- 3) the amount of influence you have over the job?
- 4) the training you receive?
- 5) the amount of pay you receive?
- 6) the job security?
- 7) the work itself?

The responses are based on a five-point scale with 1 representing “very satisfied,” 2 “satisfied,” 3 “neither satisfied nor dissatisfied,” 4 “dissatisfied,” and 5 “very dissatisfied.” For each of the seven questions listed above, we construct a binary variable for the positive responses—taking the value 1 for the “very satisfied” or “satisfied” responses and 0 otherwise—and, then, we construct a sum of the seven binary variables for each individual to form an index with values from 0 to 7 [see also [Jones et al. \(2009\)](#), [Jones and Sloane \(2010\)](#), and [Mumford and Smith \(2013\)](#)].<sup>15</sup> We use this aggregate measure as the “job satisfaction score” in our analysis. The average job satisfaction score in our sample is 4.20 and the standard deviation is 2.13. The BHPS data set, which we describe in the following subsection, has a 1–7 scale constructed based on different principles. For the sake of comparability of the estimates, we standardize the main job satisfaction measures in both WERS and BHPS around zero mean and unit variance. Thus, the dependent variable in our analysis will be the “standardized job satisfaction.”

We control for a large set of individual- and job-related characteristics. To achieve consistency between the two data sets, we construct the WERS variables similar to their counterparts in the BHPS data set. After excluding missing information on our control variables and dropping workplaces with less than two employees, the WERS data set includes 1,673 workplaces/establishments and, in each workplace, up to 25 randomly-chosen employees taking the questionnaire.<sup>16</sup> We start with describing the education variables. Since this is a workplace-level data set, “No Qualification” category includes only a very small number of observations; thus, we drop the observations in this category and concentrate on the following

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<sup>15</sup>Although [Mumford and Smith \(2013\)](#) use the six facets of job satisfaction in the WERS, neglecting the training, [Jones and Sloane \(2010\)](#) use all of them. [Jones et al. \(2009\)](#) argue that training is also an important component for job satisfaction. We also include training.

<sup>16</sup>For consistency, the individuals in the BHPS data set who work in firms with less than two employees are correspondingly dropped.

education levels: “Higher Degree” (refers to postgraduate education), “First Degree” (refers to college education), “A-level,” “O-level” (both referring to different classes of high-school education), and “Vocational Qualification.”<sup>17</sup> Earnings variable in the WERS is reported in 14 pre-specified intervals,<sup>18</sup> and, following Mumford and Smith (2009), we use the midpoints of these intervals as our earnings variable for each individual. The last interval is open ended, so it does not have a midpoint; instead, we use the mean earnings for the last interval. In our sample, the average weekly log earnings is around 5.7. We also include relative earnings as a dummy variable taking 1 if the employee earns more than the mean earnings in the sample. We categorize the job status under three sector categories: private sector job, public sector job, and other. An establishment size variable is generated from the question of “Currently, how many employees do you have on the payroll at this establishment?” The answer varies from 5 to 10,000. We construct three variables for establishment size; small establishment (less than 50 employees), medium-size establishment (between 50 and 200 employees), and large establishment (more than 200 employees). Working hours are simply represented as a dummy variable taking 1 if the actual hours worked is above the sample mean and 0 otherwise.

Among 20,035 employees and 1,673 establishments in our sample, the average age is 42, 47 percent are male, and 68 percent are married. Higher degree has the lowest fraction, whereas vocational qualifications have the highest. 46 percent of the employees are union members. 55 percent of the workplaces are publicly owned. Regarding the establishment size, the shares of small, medium, and large establishments are 0.32, 0.32, and 0.36, respectively. See Table (1) for detailed summary statistics for our WERS sample.

## 4.2 British Household Panel Survey (BHPS)

The BHPS provides information on individual-, household-, and job/employer-related characteristics from 1991 to 2008 in England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. It yearly follows the same representative sample of households interviewing every adult member of sam-

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<sup>17</sup>To be concrete, after constructing our sample, we observed that only two individuals remained in the data with no school degrees. We think that dropping these two observations would be more reasonable than generating a new education category called “no degree.” Such a category, on the other hand, exists in our BHPS sample since the number of individuals with no degree is non-negligible in the BHPS data.

<sup>18</sup>The question of the earnings variable is the following: “How much do you get paid for your job here, before tax and other deductions?”

pled households. Eighteen waves of data are available. To make the two data sets comparable and compatible, we focus on the 2004 cross-section of the BHPS.

The individual-level job satisfaction in the BHPS data set is reported based on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 (not satisfied at all) to 7 (completely satisfied). The employed workers are asked to rate the job satisfaction levels regarding the total income, job security, the actual work itself, and hours worked. The last question about job satisfaction is “Overall, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your present job?”, which is again measured on the 1–7 scale and used as the “job satisfaction score” in our analysis. As we explain above, we standardize the job satisfaction score around zero mean and unit variance to achieve consistency across the job satisfaction measures we use for the WERS and BHPS data sets.

For the individual-level observed characteristics, we control for gender, age, education level, marital status, earnings, and pay comparisons. We collapse the education-levels into seven broad groups as follows: *higher degree* refers to postgraduate education, *first degree* refers to college education, *A-level*, *O-level*, and *other higher qualification* refer to high school graduates of different types (consistent with the education system in the UK), *vocational qualification* refers to teaching, nursing, commercial, apprenticeship, and the certificate of secondary education (CSE), and, finally, the ones with *no qualification*. The earnings variable—usual gross pay per month: current job—is recorded as the actual amount received and, thus, we simply take the natural logarithm of this variable in our analysis. We also consider the “taste for working hours” variable. Promotion opportunities is described by the binary variable taking 1 if the worker has access to promotion opportunities and 0 otherwise. The rest of the variables—firm size, job status, relative earnings, and union membership—are constructed similar to their counterparts in our WERS sample.

Table (2) presents the summary statistics of the sample that we use in our analysis. In order to be included into our sample, the respondent have to be employed and report a job satisfaction score. The mean age of the respondents is 40.4. Among the 6,428 observations, 47.4 percent are male, 57.3 percent are married, 4.4 percent have higher degree, 15.8 percent have first

degree, another 12.6 percent have A-level degree, 17.6 percent have O-level degree, 30.8 percent have other higher qualifications, 9.4 percent have vocational qualifications, and the remaining 9.4 percent have no qualifications. Before standardization, the mean job satisfaction score is approximately 5.4 out of 7, with a standard deviation of 1.26. 79 percent are employed in full-time jobs. 63 percent are employed in privately-owned firms. 32.8 percent prefer to work fewer hours. 48.6 percent are employed in small-size firms. See Table (2) for further information on region- and industry-specific details. We generate group-level variables based on our reference groups constructed as industry  $\times$  region cells. Below we describe how we construct our reference groups both in the WERS and BHPS data sets.

### 4.3 Reference Groups

Our primary objective is to separately identify endogenous social effects and contextual social effects in job satisfaction within a formal empirical model of social interactions. We conceptualize the social interactions that we estimate as the existence of “spillovers” in the society in the sense that the group-level job satisfaction in one’s reference group affects the individual worker’s perception of own job satisfaction. We perform this task at two levels with two different data sets from the United Kingdom. First, we use the WERS data set to estimate spillovers at the workplace level. And, second, we use the BHPS data set to estimate job satisfaction spillovers at the local labor market level. The WERS data set captures the social effects among co-workers, who are directly interacting. The BHPS data set, on the other hand, captures social effects among individuals who are potentially interacting indirectly. As [Bramoullé et al. \(2009\)](#) clearly state, this type of social effects is based on the idea that “neighbors in the neighborhood do not affect me directly; what matters is the neighborhood itself.”

**WERS.** The WERS data sets naturally offers establishment-level reference groups; that is, all workers employed in a given establishment constitute the reference group for each of the workers employed in that establishment. There are 1,673 establishments in our WERS sample. Thus, the number of reference groups is 1,673. The average group size is approximately

12 worker per establishment. This setting defines narrow reference groups hypothesizing that social forces operate at the workplace level: workers in a given establishment are exposed to similar work-specific conditions that shape their job satisfaction perceptions. The group-level counterparts of the individual-level variables are constructed taking averages at the workplace level. Similarly, the endogenous social variable (the group-level job satisfaction score) is calculated by averaging the job satisfaction scores within the workplace.

**BHPS.** For the BHPS data set, we construct industry  $\times$  region cells as our reference groups. In terms of our conceptualization of social interactions, this means that we try to capture the social forces that operate among workers who are geographically close to each other and who are potentially exposed to similar local labor market conditions specific to the industries they belong to. This is a common way of constructing reference groups in the empirical social interactions studies, particularly the ones handling large data sets. For example, [Luttmer \(2005\)](#) utilizes the outgoing rotation groups feature of the Current Population Survey and constructs industry  $\times$  occupation cells to estimate the neighborhood effects of income on individual-level happiness. Similarly, [Ferrer-i-Carbonell \(2005\)](#) uses the German Socio-Economic Panel and constructs education  $\times$  age  $\times$  region cells to estimate the impact of the group-level income on individual-level subjective well-being. In a similar context, [Glaeser et al. \(1996\)](#) construct region-specific cells on a lattice to estimate the impact of neighbors' criminal-activity decisions on the agent's own decision to participate in crime. In another example, [Stutzer and Lalivé \(2004\)](#) use data from Switzerland cantons and construct canton-level cells to estimate the effect of social norm to work—roughly, the rate of employment in one's neighborhood—on how quickly the unemployed individual finds a job, probably due to social pressure. The examples can be extended further. In all of these papers, large reference groups are constructed to capture the peer influences in broad social settings.

In our BHPS sample, the following twelve regions describe the geographical clustering: 1) London, 2) South East, 3) South West, 4) East Anglia, 5) East Midlands, 6) West Midlands, 7) North West, 8) North East, 9) Yorkshire & Humberside, 10) Wales, 11) Scotland, and 12) Northern Ireland. Nine industry categories are selected at one-digit level as follows: 1) energy

& water supplies, 2) extraction of minerals & manufacture of metal goods, mineral products & chemicals, 3) metal goods, engineering & vehicles, 4) other manufacturing industries, 5) construction, 6) distribution, hotels & catering (repairs), 7) transport & communication, 8) banking, finance, insurance, business services & leasing, and 9) other services. At the end, there are 108 reference groups in our BHPS sample. The average group size is approximately 60 workers per industry  $\times$  region cell.

## 5 Results and Discussion

In this section, we present the estimation results, provide a detailed interpretation of the estimates, perform robustness checks, and discuss the policy implications. We use two data sets: WERS and BHPS. In WERS, establishments are the reference groups, whereas, in BHPS, reference groups are defined by the industry  $\times$  region cells. We group our estimates under three categories: individual-level coefficients, endogenous social effects, and contextual social effects. Individual-level coefficients describe the impact of individual-level observed covariates on the job satisfaction score. The endogenous social effect refers to the effect of the mean job satisfaction—where the mean is calculated at the group level—on the job satisfaction score. The contextual social effect refers to the effect of group-level counterparts of the individual-level covariates on the job satisfaction score. Below we discuss our estimates in detail. Note that both the individual- and group-level job satisfaction scores are standardized around mean zero and unit variance.

It will perhaps be useful to clearly explain how we present the results. We start with a model, which we call the “baseline” case, relying on two strong assumptions: (*i*) group-level means of the key variables are calculated by including the individual’s own outcomes and/or characteristics and (*ii*) group-level fixed effects are omitted. We acknowledge that these are strong assumptions and can contaminate the estimates. We then proceed by relaxing each of these assumptions. The final results will be the most realistic ones. This line of reasoning will allow us to evaluate the potential biases that would be caused by each of these assumptions.

## 5.1 Hierarchical Model

We start our analysis by estimating our core model: the hierarchical model of social interactions given by Equation (3.11). The estimations are performed both for the WERS & BHPS data sets. In the baseline specification, we control for group-level effects by defining them as unobserved random effects. We relax this assumption in Section 5.2, where we perform robustness checks. We report the estimates in two forms. First, we document only the marginal effects for WERS and BHPS given in Tables (3) and (4), respectively. The marginal effects are readily interpretable as the social interactions estimates, so they will be at the center of our analysis. Second, we deal with the interaction terms. The coefficients of the interaction terms are useful, because they inform us whether the social interactions effects are heterogeneous or not.

### 5.1.1 Marginal Effects

Below we separately report the marginal effects for individual-level coefficients, endogenous social effects, and contextual social effects. As usual, the marginal effects evaluate the interaction terms at their respective sample means.

**Estimates for the Individual-level Coefficients.** Our estimates for the individual-level coefficients are parallel to those reported in the previous empirical literature on the determinants of job satisfaction [see, for example, [Clark \(1996\)](#), [Clark and Oswald \(1996\)](#), and [Taylor \(2006\)](#)]. Specifically, for both WERS and BHPS, we find that females, married workers, younger workers, workers with higher earnings, workers earning more than the median wage earner in the population, workers with greater access to promotion opportunities, and workers employed in smaller establishments are more satisfied jobwise.<sup>19</sup> The first two columns of Tables (3) and (4) report the estimates of individual-level covariates for the WERS and BHPS data sets, respectively. This paper focuses on estimating spillovers in job satisfaction; thus, the rest of the paper aims to interpret the estimated social effects rather than providing a lengthy discussion of the individual-level covariates.

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<sup>19</sup>Note that the estimates for the promotion opportunities are only relevant for the BHPS, since the WERS data set does not include a question regarding the promotion prospects of the employees.

**Estimates for Endogenous Social Interactions.** A group-level variable is endogenous if its individual-level counterpart is the choice variable of interest. Hence, the associated group-level variable can be defined as the effect of other people’s behavior on individual-level behavior. This is a classic example of spillover externalities. The findings from our benchmark estimates verify that there exist significant positive spillover externalities in job satisfaction; that is, the group-level (i.e., mean) job satisfaction is positively related to individual-level job satisfaction. To put it differently, an individual worker’s job satisfaction level tends to be higher in a group of workers who are highly satisfied jobwise. We document these effects for both the WERS and BHPS samples. We find that one standard deviation increase in aggregate job satisfaction level leads to a 0.42 standard deviation increase in individual-level job satisfaction at the workplace level and 0.15 standard deviation increase in individual-level job satisfaction at the local labor market level. The first line of the estimates both in Tables (3) and (4) reports the numbers for endogenous spillovers for the WERS and BHPS data sets, respectively. Job satisfaction is often associated with workplace attitudes such as involvement in the organization, relatedness with co-workers/customers/managers, attachment, motivation, shirking, tendency to slow down work, absenteeism, etc. These attitudes form a workplace “atmosphere” and jointly contribute to the formation of worker satisfaction and performance. Our estimates confirm that the aggregate job satisfaction level in a certain work environment can be regarded as a “social” variable and may, in turn, affect individual-level job satisfaction significantly.

This result suggests that there are huge gains to policy interventions to increase individual-level job satisfaction as there are large positive feedback effects from group-level job satisfaction toward individual-level job satisfaction in the form of spillover externalities.<sup>20</sup> The degree of this feedback is larger at the workplace level than local labor market level. Thus, enforcing job satisfaction policies at the workplace level will likely be more effective than implementing such policies at the local labor market level. This result is particularly important, because it is reported in the literature that job satisfaction is positively related to worker productivity [see, for example, [Boeckerman and Ilmakunnas \(2012\)](#)]. In terms of the magnitudes, [Boeckerman](#)

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<sup>20</sup>Employers can stimulate social interactions among workers, which suggests that the optimal design of worker groups/teams should also account for these social forces [[Tumen \(2012\)](#)].

and Ilmakunnas (2012) report that one standard deviation increase in group-level job satisfaction raises productivity per hours worked by 6.6 percent. This means that the existence of spillover externalities introduces notable gains to increasing job satisfaction at the individual level.

**Estimates for the Contextual Effects.** We control for a large set of contextual variables in our regressions. However, only a few of them produce statistically significant coefficients. We start with the WERS results, in which we report estimates for social interactions at the workplace level. Our WERS regressions [see Table (3)] show that the Male, Age, Log Earnings, and Relative Earnings variables are subject to statistically significant contextual social effects. To begin with, we show that working close to a group of workers with a larger fraction of males increases job satisfaction at the workplace-level analysis. This result can be interpreted in several ways. It is well-documented in the literature that females are more likely to be absent from work due to illness-related reasons.<sup>21</sup> If this is the case, workplace attitudes such as motivation, attachment, and involvement might be weaker for females than males due to these relatively more frequent breaks in their work attendance. As a consequence, working in a group with a greater fraction of males might increase motivation and, thus, job satisfaction. A second explanation might be related to gender discrimination; that is, our finding can be interpreted as the existence of distaste against women. However, we are cautious on this interpretation as we do not have additional empirical support for this claim in our analysis. Apart from the contextual gender effects, we document that job satisfaction is higher in groups with higher average worker age and this positive impact becomes weaker as the average age goes up in our WERS sample. This can be attributed—using the Mincerian language—to labor market experience. Working in a group with a larger fraction of experienced workers may produce external effects boosting job satisfaction and, thus, worker productivity.

We also find that earnings have statistically significant contextual effects in our WERS regressions. The contextual earnings effect refers to the effect of the mean earnings in one's reference group on individual-level job satisfaction. To comply with the conventions in the literature,

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<sup>21</sup>Ichino and Moretti (2009) show that this may be related to menstrual cycles.

we construct two earnings variables: (1) the natural logarithm of earnings and (2) a dummy variable indicating the earnings rank of the worker, i.e., relative earnings. As we report in Table (3)], the average earnings in the reference group is negatively related to the individual job satisfaction score. Moreover, working in a group with a greater fraction workers earning more than the median wage also reduces individual job satisfaction.<sup>22</sup> This is consistent with the findings in the pay-comparisons literature, which suggest that job satisfaction depends on relative income comparisons [see, for example, [Clark et al. \(2009\)](#) and [Card et al. \(2012\)](#)]. Our findings confirm the view that income is evaluated relative to some comparison level based on the reference group and not only in absolute terms. This is in line with the findings reported in the literature [see, e.g., [Easterlin \(1973\)](#)].

For the BHPS analysis, we do not find any statistically significant contextual effects for the Male, Age, Log Earnings, and Relative Earnings variables at the local labor market level, unlike our workplace level analysis. This may be due to the reason that individuals care less about the group-level exogenous characteristics in larger reference groups. However, we do report a different contextual effect at the local labor market level: the promotion opportunities, a variable that does not exist in the WERS data set. Specifically, we find that working in groups with a greater fraction of workers with access to promotion opportunities reduces individual-level job satisfaction [see Table (4)]. This can be attributed to competition: that is, if there is a large fraction of workers in one's reference group expecting promotions, then this might increase excess competition in the work environment and, therefore, might reduce job satisfaction. It is interesting, however, detecting this result at the local labor market level. This may be suggesting that working in industries with harsher competition conditions reduces individual-level job satisfaction. We do not have results for this variable at the workplace level; however, if the competition hypothesis is true, we conjecture that the contextual effect of promotion opportunities would be even stronger at the workplace level.

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<sup>22</sup>So, instead of the Hirschman's tunnel effect, we observe that envy/hatred is more likely to be effective.

### 5.1.2 The Role of Heterogeneity

The discussion above focuses on the marginal effects of the variables and ignores the magnitudes of the interaction terms. But, the interaction terms in the hierarchical model may themselves yield interesting results. In particular, the interaction terms might suggest whether the endogenous and/or contextual social effects exhibit any heterogeneity, i.e., whether the social interactions estimates depend on the environment in which the associated interactions take place. For the sake of brevity, we perform this task only with the WERS data.

Our “social ecologies” model features two types of interaction terms. First, the  $m_g \times Y_g$  interaction indicates whether the endogenous social effect differs across groups with different characteristics. For example, the effect of group-level job satisfaction on individual-level job satisfaction may be different in groups with different gender dominance structures or different education compositions. Second, the  $X_{ig} \times Y_g$  interaction indicates whether the individual-level effects change with respect to group-level characteristics. For example, the relationship between individual-level characteristics and the individual-level job satisfaction scores may be different in groups with different characteristics. Table (5) reports the full set of interaction terms in the first group. The results provide interesting insights on the group-level heterogeneity structure. Most importantly, we find that the endogenous social effects are stronger in firms with a larger fraction of older and more educated workers. This suggests that working in a group of individuals with higher human capital levels exposes workers to stronger peer effects in job satisfaction. The second set of interaction terms include so many variables that it would be inefficient to report all of them. Instead, we prefer to mention verbally the most striking estimates. We find some gender effects that worth mentioning. Table (3) documents that job satisfaction is higher in groups with a greater fraction of male workers. We find that this effect is much larger for male workers than females. We also show that the negative relative income effect is felt much stronger by males than females. These patterns suggest that both endogenous and contextual social effects are subject to a certain degree of heterogeneity in the worker population.

It remains to check whether the interaction terms are jointly statistically significant or not. This is equivalent to test the relevance of our identifying assumption, which introduces non-linearities to the standard linear-in-means model through incorporating interaction terms as in Equation (3.11). If the interaction terms are jointly insignificant, then the model will favor the linear-in-means model over the hierarchical model; therefore, our model will remain fundamentally unidentified and would be subject to Manski's criticism. We test the joint significance of the interaction terms both for the WERS and BHPS data sets using the  $F$ -test. For the WERS, the interaction terms are statistically significant at 1 percent level with a  $p$ -value very close to zero. For the BHPS, the interaction terms are still jointly statistically significant, but the level of significance is 5 percent (with a  $p$  value around 0.045). This means that the validity of our identifying assumption is roughly confirmed by both of the data sets we use.

### 5.1.3 Linear-in-Means Model

Although the simple test we perform above favors the hierarchical model over the linear-in-means model and although we are aware of the fact that the linear-in-means models are potentially plagued with the reflection problem, it will still be a useful exercise to get estimates from the linear-in-means model to understand the extent to which the reflection problem could contaminate the estimates. The linear specification is given by Equation (3.1), which says that the individual-level job satisfaction is a linear function of individual-level characteristics, group-level characteristics, and group-level job satisfaction. Again, for the sake of brevity, we perform this exercise only with the WERS data set.

Table (6) reports the linear-in-means estimates. We compare them to the estimates for the hierarchical model given in Table (3). The most striking difference is that the endogenous social effect is 0.423 in the hierarchical model, while it is 0.514 in the linear-in-means model. This difference implies that the linear-in-means model overestimates the endogenous social effect by around 22 percent, which is a non-negligibly large bias. The contextual effects are also different; some differing only in magnitude, some differing in both sign and magnitude.

The punchline is that ignoring the reflection problem has a potential to generate large biases in the estimates of social interactions in job satisfaction. The reason is that when individual- and group-level outcomes are simultaneously determined within groups, then the parameter estimates from the linear-in-means model would just be a combination of the underlying structural parameters and the true social effects will be masked. The hierarchical model offers a way to separately identify the social effects.

## 5.2 Robustness Checks

In this subsection, we perform several robustness checks for the results that our hierarchical model produces. We carry out this task in two different ways. First, we calculate the group-level means of the variables using an alternative technique and, second, given the flexibility offered by this alternative formulation, we propose a different way of controlling for group-level heterogeneity. It is perhaps needed to mention at this stage that we are severely constrained by data availability in extending the variety of these robustness exercises. Overall, the two alternative exercises presented below strongly suggest that the social interactions estimates obtained from the baseline hierarchical model [see Table (3)] are robust.

### 5.2.1 An Alternative Formulation of Group-Level Variables

Since the group sizes are, on average, small especially for the WERS data set, one might suspect that the social interactions estimates reported in Table (3) could depend on the way group-level means are calculated. In our baseline calculations, the group-level means are calculated as the simple arithmetic average of the individual-level variables. In particular, our original formulation assumes that the group-level job satisfaction score that affects individual  $i$ 's job satisfaction level also includes  $i$ 's own job satisfaction. This has two potential deficiencies. First, if the groups are small, then this formulation will impose a mechanical positive correlation between the individual- and group-level job satisfaction scores, because a change in the individual-level score will be more likely generate a sizable effect on group-level job satisfaction score. Second, it is also plausible to say that the individual  $i$  in group  $g$  is exposed to a social effect that is characterized by the mean behavior in the group, where the mean is

calculated excluding  $i$ . When the groups are large, including or excluding the observation for  $i$  in calculating the group-level means should be less of a concern, since the group means will be almost identical in both cases.

Based on these concerns, we reconstruct the group-level averages for each individual, excluding the corresponding individual. We re-estimate the hierarchical model based on these new group-level definitions and the results are presented in Table (7) in the form of marginal effects. The endogenous social effect, which is 0.408, is only slightly smaller than the original estimate of 0.423. The qualitative nature of the contextual effects also remain unchanged, with the exception that the coefficients of the human capital variables are slightly smaller and the coefficients of the absolute and relative earnings variables are somewhat larger in Table (7) relative to the estimates reported in Table (3). These results suggest that our estimates are robust to the changes in the method chosen to calculate the group-level means.

### 5.2.2 Group Fixed Effects

Another potential problem with our baseline estimates is that group-level unobserved heterogeneity is controlled only by assuming a random-effects structure in the error term. By definition, the random-effects model is based on the assumption that the error term is uncorrelated with other covariates. Although, this specification is useful in controlling for the fact that the error term may exhibit within-group correlations, it would be inadequate in capturing the group-level fixed effects, which are unobserved factors correlated with the determinants of individual- and group-level variables. Fortunately, the alternative calculation procedure introduced in Section 5.2.1 allows us to incorporate the group-level fixed effects manually. Since the group-level variables are calculated excluding  $i$ , these variables offer some variation within the group. When such a variation exists, one can generate group dummies and use these dummies as group fixed effects.<sup>23</sup> We perform this task both for the WERS and BHPS

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<sup>23</sup>To understand this point, suppose that there is a group of 10 workers and each of them has received a score based on a certain test. If you calculate the group-level mean of the test score by including everyone, then the mean test score will be the same for everyone in the group. If the individual  $i$  excludes his own test score in calculating the group-level mean he faces, and if everyone does so, then the group-level means will be different for everyone in the group. When there is individual-level variation in the key group-level variables, then it becomes possible to include group-level fixed effects into the regressions. In the absence of such a variation, the group-level fixed effects would be collinear with the group-level means. In particular, the number of omitted firm dummies would be equal to the number of group-level means included into the regression. Thus, the main coefficients of interest would become uninterpretable.

datasets.

For the WERS analysis, we re-estimate the hierarchical model by incorporating these firm fixed effects in a regression in which the group-level variables are calculated excluding the individual  $i$ . Table (8) demonstrates the results. Strikingly, we find that the endogenous social effect is estimated to be 0.367, which is somewhat lower than but still reasonably close to our original estimate 0.423. This estimate also supports the qualitative nature of our results, which suggests that the social interactions in job satisfaction are strong at the firm level.<sup>24</sup> The signs and significance levels of other variables are also mostly remained unaltered—except that the coefficient of the relative income variable turned to insignificant after including group-level fixed effects. At the end, we conclude that our original WERS estimates are robust to the inclusion of firm-level fixed effects.

For the BHPS analysis, we again re-performed the estimations for our hierarchical model after incorporating the industry-region fixed effects, where the group-level variables are calculated excluding the individual  $i$ . Table (9) documents the results. The original estimate for the endogenous social effect was 0.147. We find that this estimate declined slightly and became 0.141 after including the group-level fixed effects. Again, the qualitative nature of other coefficients remains unaltered. This confirms that our BHPS estimates are robust too.

### 5.3 Policy Implications

It will perhaps be useful to put the policy implications of our results in a nutshell. These results suggest that (1) there are large gains to policy interventions to increase individual-level job satisfaction as there are significant positive feedback effects from group-level job satisfaction toward individual-level job satisfaction in the form of spillover externalities; (2) failing to account for the spillover externalities in job satisfaction may lead us to mis-assess the effectiveness of job satisfaction policies; thus, the policy maker should internalize these externalities; and (3) job satisfaction spillovers are much stronger at the workplace level than local labor

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<sup>24</sup>We would like to note that this approach is also not free of any problems. When the group size is small, the accuracy of controlling for group-level heterogeneity via a dummy variable will be low. So, from a “model selection” viewpoint, it is not clear if the model with firm fixed effects should be preferred to the model that excludes the fixed effects.

market level: therefore, designing/enforcing job satisfaction policies at the workplace level will likely be more effective than implementing such policies at the local labor market level.

Although we find that the job satisfaction spillovers are particularly strong at the workplace level, our results also suggest that it would be misleading to exclude the possibility of spillovers in broader reference groups. In other words, regional aspects of working life and conditions in the local labor markets may also induce interactions among people that can exhibit non-negligible social effects.

## 6 Concluding Remarks

There is a large literature arguing that peer effects exist in various labor market outcomes including productivity, wages, absenteeism, and learning (or knowledge spillovers). We contribute to this literature in three ways. First, this is the first paper in the literature testing the existence of job satisfaction spillovers. We show that there exist significant positive spillovers in job satisfaction. Second, we perform our analysis at two different aggregation levels using two different data sets from the United Kingdom. We find that the job satisfaction spillovers are almost three times stronger at the workplace level than local labor market level (defined in terms of industry  $\times$  region cells). This implies that although job satisfaction spillovers are strong among narrowly defined worker groups, it would be misleading to exclude the possibility of spillovers in broader reference groups. In other words, regional aspects of working life and conditions in the local labor markets may also induce interactions among people that can exhibit non-negligible social effects. Finally, we make a methodological contribution to the empirical literature by resolving the identification problem using an intuitive insight from the hierarchical models of social processes. Specifically, we hypothesize that our parameters of interest are determined within the social environments they originate from. Under reasonable specifications, this logic implies introducing certain cross-product terms into the standard estimating equations.

We conclude that there are sizable social interactions in job satisfaction that should not be

ignored in assessing policy effectiveness. The policy makers should internalize these spillover externalities. Our estimates also provide guidance on the question “at which level job satisfaction spillovers should be internalized.” We argue that firms should design and implement their own job satisfaction policies rather than relying on more general policies or institutional regulations that could only be enforced at the local labor market level (or industry level).

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<b>Variable</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std.Dev</b>
Job satisfaction	4.20	2.11
Std. job satisfaction	1.07e-08	1
<b>Individual-level Characteristics</b>		
Male	0.469	0.499
Married	0.682	0.466
Age	41.646	12.095
Higher degree	0.009	0.092
First degree	0.033	0.18
‘A’-level	0.273	0.446
‘O’-level	0.238	0.426
Vocational qual.	0.446	0.497
Log earnings	5.692	0.74
Relative earnings	0.518	0.5
Working hours	0.656	0.475
<b>Job-level Characteristics</b>		
Private sector	0.365	0.481
Public sector	0.551	0.497
Union membership	0.462	0.499
Small-size establishment	0.324	0.468
Medium-size establishment	0.318	0.466
Large-size establishment	0.358	0.48
# of observations	20,035	
# of workplaces/establishments	1,673	

Table 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS – WERS. Workplace Employment Relations Survey 2004 data set is used to construct this table.

Variable	Mean	Std.Dev
Job satisfaction	5.40	1.26
Std. job satisfaction	-3.13e-09	1
<b>Individual-level Characteristics</b>		
Male	0.474	0.499
Married	0.573	0.495
Age	40.351	12.049
Higher degree	0.044	0.205
First degree	0.158	0.365
'A'-level	0.126	0.332
'O'-level	0.176	0.381
Other higher qual.	0.308	0.462
Vocational qual.	0.094	0.292
No qual.	0.094	0.291
Log earnings	6.907	0.707
Relative earnings	0.531	0.499
<b>Job-level Characteristics</b>		
Union membership	0.331	0.412
Promotion opportunities	0.499	0.5
Full-time job	0.79	0.407
Private sector	0.63	0.48
Public sector	0.22	0.42
Prefer to work fewer hours	0.328	0.47
Prefer to work more hours	0.054	0.226
Prefer to contain same hours	0.618	0.486
Small-size establishment	0.486	0.5
Medium-size establishment	0.216	0.411
Large-size establishment	0.299	0.458
<b>Industries</b>		
Energy-water supplies	0.036	0.186
Extraction-manufacture	0.074	0.262
Metal goods-engineering	0.046	0.21
Other manufacturing	0.058	0.235
Construction	0.178	0.383
Distribution, hotels, catering	0.096	0.295
Transport-communication	0.196	0.397
Banking-finance	0.254	0.435
Other services	0.061	0.239
<b>Regions</b>		
London	0.05	0.219
South East	0.114	0.318
South West	0.054	0.226
East Anglia	0.024	0.154
East Midlands	0.052	0.222
West Midlands	0.046	0.209
Northwest	0.066	0.249
Yorkshire-Humberside	0.054	0.226
North East	0.037	0.189
Wales	0.148	0.355
Scotland	0.188	0.391
Northern Ireland	0.166	0.372
# of observations	6,428	

Table 2: SUMMARY STATISTICS – BHPS. British Household Panel Survey 2004 cross-section is used to construct this table.

**Dependent variable: job satisfaction score (standardized)**

**MARGINAL EFFECTS – Hierarchical model**

Covariate	Individual level		Group level	
	Coefficient	(St. Error)	Coefficient	(St. Error)
<b>Endogenous social effect</b>				
Mean job satisfaction (standardized)	–	–	0.423***	(0.007)
<b>Individual characteristics</b>				
Male	-0.160***	(0.017)	0.157***	(0.038)
Married	0.063***	(0.016)	-0.075	(0.051)
Age	-0.031***	(0.005)	0.026**	(0.013)
Age-squared/100	0.039***	(0.005)	-0.034**	(0.015)
First degree	0.147	(0.161)	0.094	(0.341)
‘A’-level	0.265*	(0.150)	-0.073	(0.307)
‘O’-level	0.298**	(0.500)	-0.099	(0.305)
Vocational qual.	0.430***	(0.149)	-0.211	(0.302)
Log earnings	0.232***	(0.022)	-0.203***	(0.032)
Relative earnings	0.083***	(0.021)	-0.093*	(0.057)
Working hours	-0.076***	(0.020)	0.047	(0.044)
<b>Establishment/job characteristics</b>				
Private sector	–	–	-0.003	(0.028)
Public sector	–	–	-0.004	(0.027)
Not union member	–	–	-0.015	(0.030)
Medium-size establishment	–	–	-0.003	(0.017)
Large establishment	–	–	-0.006	(0.017)
# of observations	20,035			

Table 3: ESTIMATION RESULTS (WERS). \*, \*\*, \*\*\* indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. Standard errors, clustered at the group (e.g., firm) level, are reported in parentheses. Group-level unobserved effects are controlled for. The first two columns document the estimates for individual-level coefficients, while the last two columns document those for group-level coefficients (e.g., the social interactions estimates). The coefficients should be interpreted as the “marginal effects.” Since the individual- and group-level variables are the same for WERS (i.e., the characteristics of the firm that the worker is employed is also the firm- or group-level characteristics) we drop the individual-level coefficients and report only group-level estimates for the establishment/job characteristics.

**Dependent variable: job satisfaction score (standardized)**

**MARGINAL EFFECTS – Hierarchical model**

Covariate	Individual level		Group level	
	Coefficient	(St. Error)	Coefficient	(St. Error)
<b>Endogenous social effect</b>				
Mean job satisfaction (standardized)	–	–	0.147***	(0.028)
<b>Individual characteristics</b>				
Male	-0.172***	(0.030)	0.328	(0.244)
Married	0.161***	(0.027)	0.368	(0.303)
Age	-0.028***	(0.007)	0.094	(0.070)
Age-squared/100	0.039***	(0.009)	-0.144*	(0.084)
Higher degree	0.262**	(0.102)	-1.033	(0.771)
First degree	0.194**	(0.099)	-1.048	(0.742)
‘A’-level	0.142	(0.091)	-0.701	(0.602)
‘O’-level	0.235**	(0.094)	-0.889	(0.671)
Other higher qual.	0.137	(0.096)	-0.888	(0.788)
Vocational qual.	0.052	(0.094)	-1.152	(0.790)
Log earnings	0.119***	(0.035)	-0.198	(0.193)
Relative earnings	0.111***	(0.038)	-0.233	(0.423)
<b>Job characteristics</b>				
Private sector	-0.025	(0.083)	0.196	(0.272)
Public sector	-0.127	(0.096)	0.082	(0.287)
Union membership	-0.060*	(0.033)	0.178	(0.200)
Promotion opportunities	0.282***	(0.026)	-0.430*	(0.236)
Full-time job	-0.183***	(0.044)	-0.244	(0.445)
Prefer to work fewer hours	-0.393***	(0.027)	0.276	(0.279)
Medium-size establishment	-0.181***	(0.033)	0.310	(0.337)
Large establishment	-0.162***	(0.033)	-0.052	(0.273)
# of observations	6,428			

Table 4: ESTIMATION RESULTS (BHPS). \*, \*\*, \*\*\* indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. Standard errors, clustered at the group level, are reported in parentheses. Group-level unobserved effects are controlled for. The first two columns document the estimates for individual-level coefficients, while the last two columns document those for group-level coefficients (e.g., the social interactions estimates). The coefficients should be interpreted as the “marginal effects.”

Dependent variable: job satisfaction score (standardized)		
INTERACTION TERMS ( $m_g \times Y_g$ ) – Hierarchical model		
Covariate	Coefficient	(St. Error)
<b>Individual characteristics</b>		
$m_g \times Y_g$ (Male)	0.012	(0.085)
$m_g \times Y_g$ (Married)	0.011	(0.103)
$m_g \times Y_g$ (Age)	0.044*	(0.024)
$m_g \times Y_g$ (Age-squared/100)	-0.049*	(0.029)
$m_g \times Y_g$ (First degree)	0.928*	(0.467)
$m_g \times Y_g$ ('A'-level)	0.847*	(0.416)
$m_g \times Y_g$ ('O'-level)	0.864	(0.567)
$m_g \times Y_g$ (Vocational qual.)	0.710*	(0.386)
$m_g \times Y_g$ (Log earnings)	0.039	(0.054)
$m_g \times Y_g$ (Relative earnings)	-0.119	(0.096)
$m_g \times Y_g$ (Working hours)	-0.151*	(0.083)
<b>Establishment/job characteristics</b>		
$m_g \times Y_g$ (Private sector)	0.116	(0.081)
$m_g \times Y_g$ (Public sector)	0.042	(0.078)
$m_g \times Y_g$ (Not union member)	0.127*	(0.065)
$m_g \times Y_g$ (Medium-size establishment)	-0.122**	(0.049)
$m_g \times Y_g$ (Large establishment)	-0.079	(0.053)
# of observations	20,035	

Table 5: GROUP-LEVEL INTERACTION TERMS (WERS). \*, \*\*, \*\*\* indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. Standard errors, clustered at the group (e.g., firm) level, are reported in parentheses. Group-level unobserved effects are controlled for.

**Dependent variable: job satisfaction score (standardized)**

**Linear-in-means model**

Covariate	Individual level		Group level	
	Coefficient	(St. Error)	Coefficient	(St. Error)
<b>Endogenous social effect</b>				
Mean job satisfaction (standardized)	–	–	0.514***	(0.020)
<b>Individual characteristics</b>				
Male	-0.141***	(0.017)	-0.031	(0.030)
Married	0.083***	(0.016)	0.076**	(0.037)
Age	-0.029***	(0.004)	0.008	(0.009)
Age-squared/100	0.039***	(0.005)	-0.009	(0.011)
First degree	-0.062	(0.080)	-0.231	(0.212)
‘A’-level	0.031	(0.072)	-0.277	(0.178)
‘O’-level	0.039	(0.074)	-0.445**	(0.176)
Vocational qual.	0.170**	(0.074)	-0.439**	(0.173)
Log earnings	0.136***	(0.020)	-0.099***	(0.026)
Relative earnings	0.137***	(0.021)	-0.016	(0.046)
Working hours	-0.066***	(0.020)	0.031	(0.034)
<b>Establishment/job characteristics</b>				
Private sector	–	–	-0.018	(0.020)
Public sector	–	–	-0.044**	(0.018)
Not union member	–	–	-0.102***	(0.021)
Medium-size establishment	–	–	-0.032**	(0.013)
Large establishment	–	–	-0.070***	(0.014)
# of observations	20,035			

Table 6: ESTIMATION RESULTS (WERS): *Linear-in-means model* – \*, \*\*, \*\*\* indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. Standard errors, clustered at the group (e.g., firm) level, are reported in parentheses. Group-level unobserved effects are controlled for. The first two columns document the estimates for individual-level coefficients, while the last two columns document those for group-level coefficients (e.g., the social interactions estimates). Since the individual- and group-level variables are the same for WERS (i.e., the characteristics of the firm that the worker is employed is also the firm- or group-level characteristics) we drop the individual-level coefficients and report only group-level estimates for the establishment/job characteristics.

**Dependent variable: job satisfaction score (standardized)**

**MARGINAL EFFECTS – Hierarchical model with group means excluding  $i$ .**

Covariate	Individual level		Group level	
	Coefficient	(St. Error)	Coefficient	(St. Error)
<b>Endogenous social effect</b>				
Mean job satisfaction (standardized)	–	–	0.408***	(0.008)
<b>Individual characteristics</b>				
Male	-0.143***	(0.021)	0.181***	(0.041)
Married	0.086***	(0.020)	-0.069	(0.053)
Age	-0.038***	(0.006)	0.028**	(0.014)
Age-squared/100	0.044***	(0.006)	-0.036**	(0.016)
First degree	0.122	(0.172)	0.083	(0.366)
‘A’-level	0.192	(0.177)	-0.084	(0.357)
‘O’-level	0.243**	(0.487)	-0.109	(0.352)
Vocational qual.	0.380**	(0.195)	-0.254	(0.342)
Log earnings	0.245***	(0.021)	-0.211***	(0.033)
Relative earnings	0.097***	(0.022)	-0.096*	(0.058)
Working hours	-0.066***	(0.018)	0.039	(0.046)
<b>Establishment/job characteristics</b>				
Private sector	–	–	-0.001	(0.032)
Public sector	–	–	-0.005	(0.029)
Not union member	–	–	-0.028	(0.034)
Medium-size establishment	–	–	0.004	(0.022)
Large establishment	–	–	-0.002	(0.021)
# of observations	20,035			

Table 7: ESTIMATION RESULTS (WERS): *Group means exclude  $i$*  – \*, \*\*, \*\*\* indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. Standard errors, clustered at the group (e.g., firm) level, are reported in parentheses. Group-level unobserved effects are controlled for. The first two columns document the estimates for individual-level coefficients, while the last two columns document those for group-level coefficients (e.g., the social interactions estimates). The coefficients should be interpreted as the “marginal effects.” Since the individual- and group-level variables are the same for WERS (i.e., the characteristics of the firm that the worker is employed is also the firm- or group-level characteristics) we drop the individual-level coefficients and report only group-level estimates for the establishment/job characteristics.

**Dependent variable: job satisfaction score (standardized)**

**MARGINAL EFFECTS – Hierarchical model with group means excluding  $i$ .**

**Firm fixed effects are included.**

Covariate	Individual level		Group level	
	Coefficient	(St. Error)	Coefficient	(St. Error)
<b>Endogenous social effect</b>				
Mean job satisfaction (standardized)	–	–	0.367***	(0.026)
<b>Individual characteristics</b>				
Male	-0.096***	(0.026)	0.149***	(0.051)
Married	0.081***	(0.025)	-0.043	(0.062)
Age	-0.032***	(0.010)	0.023*	(0.015)
Age-squared/100	0.035***	(0.011)	-0.027*	(0.017)
First degree	0.099	(0.192)	0.052	(0.392)
‘A’-level	0.161	(0.197)	-0.061	(0.422)
‘O’-level	0.203	(0.381)	-0.089	(0.386)
Vocational qual.	0.320*	(0.191)	-0.199	(0.401)
Log earnings	0.211***	(0.027)	-0.188***	(0.057)
Relative earnings	0.091***	(0.024)	-0.085	(0.072)
Working hours	-0.056**	(0.029)	0.029	(0.051)
<b>Establishment/job characteristics</b>				
Private sector	–	–	-0.001	(0.037)
Public sector	–	–	0.012	(0.046)
Not union member	–	–	-0.041	(0.066)
Medium-size establishment	–	–	-0.016	(0.052)
Large establishment	–	–	0.007	(0.053)
<b>Firm fixed effects</b>				
<b>Included</b>				
# of observations	20,035			

Table 8: ESTIMATION RESULTS (WERS): *Group means exclude  $i$ , firm fixed effects included* – \*, \*\*, \*\*\* indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. Standard errors, clustered at the group (e.g., firm) level, are reported in parentheses. Group-level unobserved effects are controlled for. The first two columns document the estimates for individual-level coefficients, while the last two columns document those for group-level coefficients (e.g., the social interactions estimates). The coefficients should be interpreted as the “marginal effects.” Since the individual- and group-level variables are the same for WERS (i.e., the characteristics of the firm that the worker is employed is also the firm- or group-level characteristics) we drop the individual-level coefficients and report only group-level estimates for the establishment/job characteristics. Firm-level fixed effects are included.

**Dependent variable: job satisfaction score (standardized)**

**MARGINAL EFFECTS – Hierarchical model**

**Industry-region cell fixed effects are included.**

Covariate	Individual level		Group level	
	Coefficient	(St. Error)	Coefficient	(St. Error)
<b>Endogenous social effect</b>				
Mean job satisfaction (standardized)	–	–	0.141***	(0.031)
<b>Individual characteristics</b>				
Male	-0.151***	(0.036)	0.216	(0.301)
Married	0.146***	(0.031)	0.221	(0.441)
Age	-0.027***	(0.008)	0.054	(0.091)
Age-squared/100	0.037***	(0.010)	-0.066	(0.097)
Higher degree	0.251**	(0.107)	-1.201	(0.894)
First degree	0.183*	(0.111)	-1.103	(0.801)
‘A’-level	0.110	(0.103)	-0.755	(0.792)
‘O’-level	0.216*	(0.124)	-0.904	(0.687)
Other higher qual.	0.109	(0.122)	-1.001	(0.904)
Vocational qual.	0.021	(0.127)	-1.202	(0.905)
Log earnings	0.111***	(0.037)	-0.123	(0.240)
Relative earnings	0.104***	(0.040)	-0.175	(0.501)
<b>Job characteristics</b>				
Private sector	-0.029	(0.084)	0.101	(0.303)
Public sector	-0.110	(0.106)	0.044	(0.401)
Union membership	-0.029	(0.041)	0.099	(0.386)
Promotion opportunities	0.211***	(0.052)	-0.211	(0.388)
Full-time job	-0.141***	(0.054)	-0.178	(0.489)
Prefer to work fewer hours	-0.288***	(0.051)	0.200	(0.476)
Medium-size establishment	-0.149***	(0.037)	0.234	(0.356)
Large establishment	-0.141***	(0.036)	-0.012	(0.298)
Industry-region fixed effects	<b>Included</b>			
# of observations	6,428			

Table 9: ESTIMATION RESULTS (BHPs): *Group means exclude i, industry-region cell fixed effects included* – \*, \*\*, \*\*\* indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. Standard errors, clustered at the group (e.g., industry-region) level, are reported in parentheses. Group-level unobserved effects are controlled for. The first two columns document the estimates for individual-level coefficients, while the last two columns document those for group-level coefficients (e.g., the social interactions estimates). The coefficients should be interpreted as the “marginal effects.” Group-level fixed effects are included.

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