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August 2024

Working Paper No: 24/10

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SUPPLY- AND DEMAND-DRIVEN INFLATION DECOMPOSITION IN TÜRKİYE*

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Abstract

We document the demand and supply driven components of inflation in Türkiye following the decomposition of [Shapiro \(2022\)](#). The results suggest that the recent acceleration in inflation starts with supply-driven inflation, but over time it transitioned into an inflationary environment driven by demand. Consistent with the theory, oil-supply and exchange rate shocks act to increase the supply-driven contribution, whereas monetary policy tightening acts to reduce the demand-driven contribution of inflation. This decomposition can potentially be a useful real-time tracker for policymakers.

Keywords: Inflation decomposition, Demand, Supply, Exchange rate pass-through

JEL Classification: E12; E24; E31; E52

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Non-Technical Summary

At the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, lockdowns caused significant disruptions in supply chains, leading to higher prices for commodities and goods. This created inflation pressures primarily driven by supply constraints. These supply shocks eventually spilled over into some sectors, causing negative demand shocks. However, large fiscal stimulus packages and accommodative monetary policies soon led to a quick recovery in demand, which then began to drive inflationary pressures from the demand side.

During this period, distinguishing whether inflation was driven by supply or demand factors became crucial for effective real-time policymaking. In our paper, we aim to explore the extent to which supply and demand factors influence inflation in Türkiye. We decompose inflation into supply-driven and demand-driven components using sectoral retail price index data, following the methodology developed by Shapiro (2022). The retail price and volume index data encompass the following sectors: (1) food, beverages, and tobacco, (2) computers, software, and telecommunication equipment, (3) hardware, household appliances, and furniture, (4) textiles, clothing, and footwear, (5) pharmaceuticals, medical equipment, and orthopedic goods, as well as cosmetic articles, (6) internet and mail orders, and (7) fuel. Collectively, these sectors account for approximately 60% of the consumption basket.

In our approach, each sector's monthly inflation is classified as either demand-driven or supply-driven based on residuals from separate price and quantity regressions at the sector level. If the residuals for both price and quantity share the same sign, it indicates a net demand shock, classifying the sector's inflation as demand-driven for that month. Conversely, if the residuals have opposite signs, it suggests a supply shock, classifying the inflation as supply driven. The rationale behind this is that supply shocks typically cause prices and quantities to move in opposite directions, whereas demand shocks cause them to move in the same direction. We then calculate the total contribution of demand- and supply-driven components to aggregate inflation each month by summing the weighted sectoral inflation rates labelled as either demand- or supply-driven.

To validate our methodology, we first present narrative evidence to check if the decomposition aligns with significant economic events in Türkiye. We then empirically investigate the response of supply- and demand-driven inflation to various known supply and demand shocks. Our analysis includes local projections using high-frequency identified monetary policy shocks and global oil supply shocks. The findings show that monetary policy surprises significantly reduce demand-driven inflation but do not affect supply-driven inflation. Conversely, oil supply shocks increase supply-driven inflation without impacting demand-driven inflation. These results align with our theoretical understanding and validate our approach. Additionally, we present Phillips curve estimations using supply- and demand-driven inflation components. Our analysis documents a downward bias in the slope of the Phillips curve due to supply shocks, further affirming the robustness of our methodological approach.

1 Introduction

During the COVID-19 pandemic, nearly all countries experienced a significant surge in inflation, reaching levels unprecedented since the 1970s and 80s. In response to the sharp and severe contraction caused by the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and the subsequent lockdowns in early 2020, central banks worldwide implemented a range of conventional and unconventional monetary policy measures to support economic activity. As an emerging open economy, Türkiye faced an even higher and more volatile inflation surge compared to other countries, reaching a peak of 85%, making it crucial to understand the driving forces behind this increase for effective policy-making.¹

At the beginning of the COVID-19 period, lockdowns led to supply chain disruptions and an increase in commodity and goods prices, consequently creating supply-driven inflation pressures. Subsequently, these supply shocks spilled over into negative demand shocks in some sectors (Guerrieri et al., 2022). However, with large fiscal stimulus packages and an accommodative monetary policy stance, demand quickly recovered and began to exert demand-driven inflationary pressures.² During this time period, discerning whether inflation is demand-driven or supply-driven is crucial for policymaking in real-time. In this paper, we aim to document the extent to which supply and demand factors drive inflation in Türkiye.

We utilize sectoral CPI data to decompose inflation into supply- and demand-driven components, following the methodology of Shapiro (2022). For each sector in a given month, inflation is classified as demand-driven or supply-driven based on the residuals collected from separate sector-level price and quantity regressions. If, within a sector, residuals in both price and quan-

¹Between September 2021 and May 2023, the Central Bank of the Republic of Türkiye (CBRT) pursued an expansionary monetary policy. Additionally, on top of the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, Türkiye was struck by a devastating earthquake in February 2023. This event exacerbated supply-side issues due to damage to production facilities, disruptions in supply chains, and power shortages.

²Additionally, a significant rise in supply-driven inflation occurred in early 2022, primarily due to economic disruptions stemming from the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These patterns observed during both the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath closely align with the conclusions drawn in studies conducted by Baqaee and Farhi (2022), Ferrante et al. (2023), Bernanke and Blanchard (2023), Lorenzoni and Werning (2023) and di Giovanni et al. (2023), all of which utilize structural methodologies.

tivity regressions share the same sign, the sector likely experiences a net demand shock, categorizing sectoral inflation as demand-driven for that month. Conversely, if residuals exhibit opposite signs, sectoral inflation is categorized as supply-driven. The rationale is that supply shocks should move prices and quantities in opposite directions, while demand shocks should move them in the same direction. Subsequently, the total contribution of demand- and supply-driven components to aggregate inflation in a month is calculated as the weighted sums of sectoral inflation rates labeled as either demand- or supply-driven.

The methodology necessitates price and quantity series data at the sectoral level. However, this data is only available for a limited number of sectors in Türkiye, primarily based on retail sales. TURKSTAT (the Turkish Statistical Institute) publishes the retail price and volume index data monthly. Our dataset spans from January 2010 to February 2024. The covered sectors encompass: (1) food, beverages, and tobacco, (2) computers, software and telecommunication equipment, (3) hardware, household appliances and furniture, (4) textiles, clothing and footwear, (5) pharmaceuticals, medical equipment, and orthopaedic goods, as well as cosmetic articles, (6) internet and mail orders, and (7) fuel. Collectively, these sectors account for approximately 60% of the consumption basket.

Turkish inflation has soared to levels not witnessed in decades, reaching its peak at 85 percent per annum in September 2022, before gradually subsiding to approximately 40 percent by spring 2023. In stark contrast, inflation stood below 10 percent before the onset of the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic. The decomposition reveals that the slight decline in inflation at the onset of the pandemic was driven by a reduction in demand-driven inflation. Subsequently, inflation began to rise, with increases observed in both demand- and supply-driven inflation toward the end of 2020. This moderate increase continued until the end of 2021, but afterward, there was a significant hike in inflation stemming from both demand- and supply-driven factors, coinciding with the re-loosening of interest rates in September 2021 and the depreciation of the Turkish lira aftermath. Supply-driven inflation weakened over time, consistent with the global recovery from supply chain disruptions. Nonetheless, supply-driven inflation still constitutes a large portion

of aggregate inflation due to changes in exchange rates and unanchored inflation expectations. Demand-driven inflation remained robust due to accommodative monetary policy until the end of 2023. With the recent tightening cycle in monetary policy reaching its peak in March 2024, demand-driven inflation has started to decline.

To validate the methodology, we initially present narrative evidence to assess whether the decomposition aligns with key economic events in Türkiye. Then, we present Phillips curve estimations utilizing supply- and demand-driven inflation and document the downward bias on the slope of the Phillips curve stemming from supply shocks, further affirming the robustness of the methodological approach. Additionally, we empirically investigate the response of supply- and demand-driven inflation to various supply and demand shocks from the literature. We conduct local projections using high-frequency identified monetary policy shocks and global oil supply shocks. The results demonstrate that monetary policy surprises induce a significant decline in demand-driven inflation and do not impact supply-driven inflation, whereas oil supply shocks increase supply-driven inflation and do not affect demand-driven inflation. Thus, the empirical results are consistent with the theoretical understanding, which improves the validity of the approach.

This paper further contributes to the literature by examining the relationship between exchange rate and both supply- and demand-driven inflation. [Taylor \(2000\)](#) argues that in environments characterized by low and stable inflation, firms are less likely to adjust prices in response to exchange rate fluctuations, leading to lower exchange rate pass-through. In contrast, in high inflation environments, firms are more inclined to adjust prices to protect profit margins, resulting in a higher degree of pass-through.³ Moreover, [Gopinath and Itskhoki \(2010\)](#) suggest that the extent of pass-through is influenced by market structures, pricing-to-market behavior, and the nature of the underlying shocks—whether they are supply- or demand-driven. Our findings indicate that both supply- and demand-driven inflation rates are responsive to exchange rate shocks.

³A related strand of literature focuses on the macroeconomic exchange rate pass-through to aggregate price indices, as examined by [Bacchetta and van Wincoop \(2004\)](#), [Gagnon and Ihrig \(2004\)](#) and [Campa and Goldberg \(2005\)](#). [Alvarez et al. \(2018\)](#) empirically document that the frequency of price adjustment increases with higher inflation.

The stronger response observed in supply-driven inflation is due to the increased pressure on prices from higher import and marginal costs, while the relatively weaker yet significant response of demand-driven inflation can be explained by the wealth effect arising from the high dollarization rate in Türkiye.

Overall, the decomposition enables tracking the impact of policies in real-time, as it can be updated monthly and serves as an additional economic indicator. Section-2 describes the data and methodology, while Section-3 presents the inflation decomposition and the narrative evidence. Section-4 presents Phillips Curve estimation. Section-5 documents the response of demand- and supply-driven inflation to various exogenous shocks, and Section-6 concludes.

2 Data and Methodology

The methodology requires price and quantity series at the sectoral level. This data is only available for limited number of sectors in Türkiye and the available data is based on retail sales.⁴ The sectors covered include: (1) food, drinks, tobacco, (2) computers, software, telecommunication equipment, etc., (3) hardware, household appliances, furniture, etc., (4) textiles, clothing, and footwear, (5) pharmaceutical, medical, and orthopedic goods, cosmetic articles, (6) internet and mail orders, and (7) fuel. Ideally, more granular data would be preferable for the decomposition; however, price and quantity data at the 3-digit sector level are only available in a few countries (Firat and Hao, 2023).⁵ This data is available from 2010 onwards and covers nearly 60% of the CPI basket. In addition, the breakdown of sectors in the total consumption basket, presented as percentages, is as follows:

1. Food, beverages and tobacco: 28.5%

⁴TURKSTAT (Turkish Statistical Institute) publishes the data monthly. Retail price index is used for the analysis due to data restrictions, which is a common practice in the absence of full data (see Cloyne and Hürtgen (2016)). TURKSTAT provides the Central Bank of the Republic of Türkiye (CBRT) with the expenditure weight of each sector. These weights are meticulously mapped to correspond with the inflation weights.

⁵Firat and Hao (2023) conducts a cross-country analysis and uses only 4 sectors for most countries in the sample to decompose inflation into supply and demand-driven components.

2. Computers, software and telecommunication equipment: 7.8%
3. Hardware, household appliances, and furniture: 6.5%
4. Textiles, clothing, and footwear: 7.4%
5. Pharmaceuticals, medical equipment, orthopaedic goods, and cosmetic articles: 3.3%
6. Internet and mail orders: %
7. Fuel: 3.8%

We closely follow the methodology from [Shapiro \(2022\)](#) to decompose inflation into supply- and demand-driven components.⁶ The main assumption behind this methodology is that demand shocks move prices and quantities in the same direction, while supply shocks move them in opposite directions.⁷ We first run the following price and quantity regressions for each available sector s :

$$q_{s,t} = \sum_{i=1}^{12} \beta^{qq} p_{s,t-i} + \sum_{i=1}^{12} \beta^{qq} q_{s,t-i} + c + \gamma_t + \gamma_t^2 + \varepsilon_{s,t}^q$$

$$p_{s,t} = \sum_{i=1}^{12} \beta^{pp} p_{s,t-i} + \sum_{i=1}^{12} \beta^{pq} q_{s,t-i} + c + \gamma_t + \gamma_t^2 + \varepsilon_{s,t}^p$$

where $q_{s,t}$ and $p_{s,t}$ are log quantity and log price index for sector s in time t . c is constant and γ_t is deterministic linear and quadratic time trends. The controls are 12 lags of price and quantity to account for existing trends and are not likely to capture a shift in demand or supply in time t . Effectively, residuals capture surprise increases (or decreases) in prices and quantities. Inflation in a sector is identified as demand-driven if both price growth (inflation) and output growth exceed or fall short of the expected levels based on their past values (12 lags).⁸ If inflation and output growth move in opposite directions compared to expected levels, it is classified as supply-driven.

⁶[Sheremirov \(2022\)](#) introduces a similar decomposition.

⁷The main caveat in this exercise is that although supply and demand shocks affect a sector simultaneously in a given month, we categorize the sector as either demand- or supply-driven based on the more prevalent shock in that month. So, the categorization is a noisy measure of underlying shocks and a more granular level of disaggregation would be better at attenuating this noise.

⁸Additionally, a time trend can be added to the regression, but the demand and supply-driven inflation obtained from the baseline specification are robust to such alternative specifications.

Hence, the residuals $\varepsilon_{s,t}^q$ and $\varepsilon_{s,t}^p$ are basically used to label each sector s in each month t using the following restrictions ⁹:

$$\mathbb{1}_{s \in Demand, t} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \varepsilon_{s,t}^q \varepsilon_{s,t}^p > 0 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$\mathbb{1}_{s \in Supply, t} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \varepsilon_{s,t}^q \varepsilon_{s,t}^p < 0 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

In this way, inflation in each sector in each month is labeled as demand- or supply-driven. Subsequently, monthly aggregate inflation can be decomposed into supply- and demand-driven components as follows:

$$\pi_{t,t-1} = \underbrace{\sum_s \mathbb{1}_{s \in Supply, t} \omega_{s,t} \pi_{s,t,t-1}}_{\text{Supply Driven, } \pi_{t,t-1}^{Sup}} + \underbrace{\sum_s \mathbb{1}_{s \in Demand, t} \omega_{s,t} \pi_{s,t,t-1}}_{\text{Demand Driven, } \pi_{t,t-1}^{Dem}}$$

where $\omega_{s,t}$ is the weight of sector s and $\pi_{s,t,t-1}$ denotes the monthly inflation of sector s between time $t-1$ and t . Supply-driven inflation ($\pi_{t,t-1}^{Sup}$) is calculated as the weighted sum of sectoral inflation rates from sectors hit by supply shock. Similarly, demand-driven inflation ($\pi_{t,t-1}^{Dem}$) is driven as the weighted sum of sectoral inflation rates from sectors hit by demand shock. Finally, supply- and demand-driven contributions to year-over-year inflation are constructed as the run-

⁹As [Shapiro \(2022\)](#) discusses, the use of sign restrictions comes with some caveats that should be emphasized. First, the structural shocks are only set-identified, meaning their size cannot be determined without additional identification restrictions. Consequently, changes over time in the supply- and demand-driven contributions do not reflect changes in the magnitude of the structural supply and demand shocks. Instead, the measures constructed in this study will track the proportion of (expenditure-weighted) categories that are experiencing at least a supply shock or at least a demand shock. The signs of the residuals only indicate whether a supply shock or a demand shock has occurred. When demand elasticity is relatively high, the simultaneous shock is attributed to a supply shock, whereas when demand elasticity is relatively low, the simultaneous shock is attributed to a demand shock.

ning product of current and past inflation components:

$$\pi_{t,t-12}^{Sup} = \prod_{k=0}^{11} (1 + \pi_{t-k,t-k-1}^{Sup}) - 1 \quad \text{and} \quad \pi_{t,t-12}^{Dem} = \prod_{k=0}^{11} (1 + \pi_{t-k,t-k-1}^{Dem}) - 1$$

In this way, the methodology facilitates a comprehensive demand-driven and supply-driven decomposition of inflation, enabling a detailed examination of the distinct impacts of supply and demand shocks on price dynamics, thus offering crucial insights for policymakers.

3 Decomposing Inflation and Narrative Evidence

Figure-1 displays the supply- and demand-driven contributions to year-over-year inflation rate in Türkiye.




Figure 1: Supply- and demand-driven Inflation

Notes: The 12-month change in retail inflation is divided into contributions determined as supply-driven (blue) and demand-driven (red). [Shapiro \(2022\)](#) decomposition is used and the results are driven by seven underlying sectors. The sample period covers 2011m12-2024m4.

Given the high and volatile inflation during this period, it is appropriate to provide narrative evidence to assess the consistency of the decomposition. Monetary tightening in the second quarter of 2018 reduced demand-driven inflation in subsequent months. Following the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, demand-driven inflation even turned negative for a few months in 2020. During this period, supply-driven inflation surged due to supply chain disruptions and rising commodity prices, mirroring trends observed globally. With accommodative monetary policy and large fiscal support, demand-driven inflation quickly raised and with the rate cuts starting from September 2021, demand driven-inflation surged further due to large negative real rates. Indeed, supply-driven inflation reached its peak in the spring of 2022, primarily attributed to disruptions in food and energy supplies. These disruptions were further compounded by factors such as the invasion of Ukraine and the depreciation of the Turkish lira. From August 2021 to June 2022, the USD/TRY exchange rate nearly doubled, exerting substantial pressure on supply-driven inflation through increased import prices and unanchored inflation expectations, as both increasing short-term inflation expectations and import prices are inflationary (Figure-2).¹⁰ With the sudden depreciation and heightened volatility in nominal exchange rates, exchange-rate pass through has increased significantly during this period due to increasing attention within domestic market, which has become highly dollarized since the depreciation wave in 2018. Consistent with the standard New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) in an open market economy, increasing inflation expectations, markups, and import prices exerted upward pressure on firms' pricing dynamics.¹¹ Nonetheless, 12-month inflation reached its 30-year high in October 2022. FX interventions stabilized the USD/TRY exchange rate between September 2022 and May 2023, resulting in a significant decline in supply-driven inflation, primarily driven by the stabilizing recovery in global supply chains, declining commodity prices, inflation expectations, and import price pressures, alongside diminishing household and firm attentiveness to exchange rates. Throughout

¹⁰See [Ascari et al. \(2023\)](#) and [Blanchard and Gali \(2007\)](#).

¹¹We will control for expectations and import prices, but fluctuations in markups might matter for the variation in inflation as well. Markups will be in the error term, which basically includes any remaining cost-push shocks. Residual mark-up shocks might not be a problem if they include the impact of factors that are independent of monetary policy ([Eser et al., 2020](#)).

this period, demand-driven inflation remained elevated due to large negative real interest rates and loose credit policies. The results are robust to alternative specifications (see Table-A1).




Figure 2: Supply- and demand-driven Inflation, and Δ Exchange Rate

Notes: The 12-month change in retail inflation is divided into contributions determined as supply-driven (red) and demand-driven (blue). The 12-month percent change in the exchange rate (USD/TRY) is depicted on the right-axis.

In the summer of 2023, the Central Bank of the Republic of Türkiye (CBRT) initiated a hiking cycle alongside fiscal tightening measures.¹² It is anticipated that this action will mitigate demand-driven inflation in the subsequent months as the output gap declines, accompanied by a decrease in supply-driven inflation owing to less volatile exchange rates and declining inflation expectations. After May 2023, the depreciation of the Turkish lira continued, compounded by the impact of the devastating earthquake.¹³ These measures would likely mitigate demand-driven inflation in the subsequent months as the output gap declines, accompanied by a decrease in supply-driven inflation due to less volatile exchange rates and declining inflation expectations.

¹²This led to an increase in supply-driven inflation for a few months due to higher taxes on various goods.

¹³In February 2023, Türkiye was struck by an earthquake, unleashing significant economic repercussions alongside the humanitarian crisis. The seismic event disrupted both demand and supply dynamics, causing extensive damage to infrastructure, production facilities, and supply chains. This disruption led to a surge in demand for reconstruction materials and services, exacerbating inflationary pressures.

Following the initiation of the rate hike cycle in June 2023, the interest rate reached 50% by March 2024, rising from 8.5%. Consequently, the exchange rate began to stabilize, and with tightening monetary and fiscal measures, demand started to cool, reflected in the decline in demand-driven inflation since early 2024. This narrative effectively validates the mentioned inflation decomposition, which aligns closely with nearly all developments in Türkiye’s volatile economic environment over the past few years.




Figure 3: Supply- and demand-driven Inflation

Notes: The 12-month change in retail inflation is divided into contributions determined as supply-driven (blue), demand-driven (red), and ambiguous (gray). [Shapiro \(2022\)](#) decomposition is used and the results are driven by seven underlying sectors. The sample period covers 2011m12-2024m4.

In this highly volatile environment, coupled with persistent high trend inflation, supply and demand shocks might simultaneously disrupt the markets. For this reason, if the residuals from the benchmark regression are too small, labeling an entire month as either supply- or demand-driven inflation might be misleading. Therefore, if the residuals are relatively small—specifically,

lower than 0.1 standard deviations from zero—they are considered insignificant.¹⁴ In such cases, we relabel them as ambiguous. This relabeling applies to less than 20% of sector-month observations. Figure 3 illustrates that ambiguity tends to be more prevalent during periods of lower turbulence. This occurs because structural shocks are not substantial enough to cause significant shifts in either demand or supply, or multiple shocks occur simultaneously, preventing the residuals from deviating significantly from zero. Since the beginning of 2024, as the economy has started to cool down, and the decline in demand-driven inflation is evident, indicating that the hawkish monetary stance is effectively suppressing demand.¹⁵

After providing narrative evidence, our validation exercises for the decomposition analysis also include a Phillips curve estimation and a local projection estimation:

(i) For the Phillips curve exercise, we employ monthly retail volume as a proxy for the output gap, computed using the [Hamilton \(2018\)](#) filter. This is coupled with 12-month ahead inflation expectations and import prices.¹⁶ Then, we estimate the slope of the Phillips curve for the demand and supply-driven components of inflation separately.

(ii) Using local projections, we utilize monthly monetary policy shock series from [Bauer and Swanson \(2023\)](#) and oil supply shocks from [Känzig \(2021\)](#) to estimate the impact of exogenous shocks on the demand and supply-driven components of inflation separately.

4 Phillips Curve Estimation

The Phillips Curve plays a pivotal role in understanding the transmission of monetary policy. In a standard New Keynesian (NK) model, the Phillips Curve is driven by the pricing decisions of firms and essentially serves as the short-run aggregate supply curve, linking inflation to the output gap

¹⁴The 0.1 cutoff is arbitrary; however, the results remain robust even when changing the cutoff to 0.2 standard deviations from zero.

¹⁵The ambiguous category has grown larger due to stabilization at the same time period.

¹⁶Inflation expectations are retrieved from the Central Bank of the Republic of Türkiye (CBRT) and import prices are retrieved from TURKSTAT.

and cost-push (or markup) shocks.¹⁷ The output gap, influenced by monetary policy, affects consumption, investment, and thus the marginal costs of firms. Consequently, slack is transmitted to inflation through the pricing mechanism of firms, as depicted by the equation:

$$\pi_t = E_t \pi_{t+1} + \kappa x_t + \varepsilon_t \quad (1)$$

In an open economy version of New Keynesian model, where there are imported goods¹⁸ in intermediate goods production function (Blanchard and Gali, 2007), there is an additional channel in firms' pricing decisions through import prices. A hybrid New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) can be expressed as follows:¹⁹

$$\pi_t = \lambda_b \pi_{t-1} + \lambda_f E_t \pi_{t+1} + \gamma \pi_t^m + \kappa x_t + \varepsilon_t \quad (2)$$

where x_t denotes the output gap as the deviation from the trend, $E_t \pi_{t+1}$ is 12-month ahead inflation expectations, and π_t^m stands for annual import price inflation. According to this structural relationship, λ_b and λ_f should be positive and sum to 1 if the discount rate β equals 1 (Gali and Gertler, 1999). γ is expected to be positive since increasing import prices translate into higher marginal costs for firms.

Demand shocks influence the output gap and subsequently impact inflation in the same direction, proportional to the structural Phillips slope coefficient, κ . If only demand shocks were present, the structural coefficient could be derived from the reduced-form estimates. κ is expected to be positive as it represents the main mechanism for monetary policy transmission: a positive deviation of consumption and investment from the potential level due to loose monetary policy should be reflected in prices, driven by increasing marginal costs resulting from inefficient

¹⁷Residual cost-push shocks are not problematic as long as they remain independent of monetary policy. The residual term captures all relevant factors that may impact observed inflation.

¹⁸The import share in production is close to 20% in Türkiye (Erduman et al., 2020). This number is close to 35% in manufacturing production.

¹⁹The backward-looking inflation component appears when there is indexation to past inflation in price-setting, capturing the adaptive component of inflation expectations.

production levels to satisfy higher demand.²⁰

Identification of this structural equation is challenging. The positive structural relationship between the output gap and inflation can be masked by monetary policy if it is successful at undoing all demand shocks. In fact, the relationship between the output gap and inflation might even be negative in response to cost-push shocks (Bullard, 2018). So, improved monetary policy could flatten the reduced-form (empirical) Phillips Curve, as observed in many advanced countries over the past three decades. A successful monetary policy would eliminate any deviations caused by demand shocks, making it difficult to discern the underlying positive relationship between the output gap and inflation due to the lack of variation. In the case of cost-push shocks, optimal policy would tolerate output gaps from potential output to some extent, due to trade-off between stabilizing inflation and output gap. Consequently, cost-push shocks create negative relationship between the output gap and inflation. Thus, reduced-form regressions are unlikely to recover the structural relationship between the output gap and inflation if monetary policy is conducted optimally (McLeay and Tenreyro, 2020). However, no monetary policy is set optimally in reality, and as a result, the Phillips Curve is likely to appear empirically with the correct methodological approach. We need to have either (i) exogenous demand shifter, such as monetary policy shocks, to identify the positive slope, or (ii) we need to control for supply shocks so that variation in aggregate demand can dominate and the structural Phillips Curve can be recovered.²¹ In short, isolating the demand-driven variation in inflation is essential to capturing the positive slope of the Phillips Curve.

Opting for the first approach,²² we will control for supply shocks by including import inflation in regressions.²³ However, in practice, there are numerous supply shocks that need to be

²⁰There is no rationing in standard models, although it could be relevant, especially during the COVID-19 period.

²¹If one can control for the effect of cost-push fully, then any remaining variation in the output gap and inflation must stem from the variation in aggregate demand (McLeay and Tenreyro 2020). However, in practice, there are many supply shocks that need to be controlled for, and which of these are most important may be time varying as well.

²²A monetary policy shock for Türkiye should be constructed to follow second approach and this is a work in progress.

²³The correlation between exchange rate and import inflation is higher than 0.9, so the exchange rate is not included in regressions.

controlled for. To mitigate a subset of these cost-push shocks, a mechanical approach is to focus on core inflation rather than headline inflation, as many papers do. We go a step further and decompose inflation into supply- and demand-driven components.

	(1) Inflation	(2) Supply-Inf	(3) Demand-Inf	(4) Inflation	(5) Supply-Inf	(6) Demand-Inf
$\sum_{j=1}^{11} \pi_{t-j}$	0.550*** (0.059)	0.585*** (0.048)	0.783*** (0.078)	0.562*** (0.061)	0.593*** (0.062)	0.783*** (0.092)
$E_t \pi_{t+1}$	0.647*** (0.121)	0.311*** (0.041)	0.084 (0.065)	0.614*** (0.120)	0.298*** (0.059)	0.092 (0.073)
π_t^m	0.130*** (0.015)	0.085*** (0.016)	0.031*** (0.007)	0.133*** (0.015)	0.079*** (0.015)	0.033*** (0.006)
x_t	0.035 (0.042)	-0.055*** (0.014)	0.056*** (0.018)			
Unemployment				-0.262 (0.180)	0.189 (0.141)	-0.250** (0.115)
Observations	127	127	127	138	138	138
R^2	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.98

Table 1: Slope of the Phillips Curve: A Comparison of Demand- and Supply-Driven Inflation

Notes: Entries are coefficients and standard errors from estimating regression (2). Newey-West standard errors are in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. x_t represents the output gap, obtained from retail sales data using the Hamilton filter. π_t^m denotes import inflation, and $E_t \pi_{t+1}$ represents 12-month ahead inflation expectations of professionals. "Supply-Inf" refers to the supply-driven component of inflation, while "Demand-Inf" refers to the demand-driven component. The sample period covers 2013m1-2024m6.

We utilize the deviation of monthly retail sales from the trend, obtained using the [Hamilton \(2018\)](#) filter, as our proxy for slack. Our inflation data here is retail price inflation, further decomposed into demand- and supply-driven inflation. Mechanically, for demand-driven inflation, cost-push shocks affecting the aggregate inflation rate are stripped out. So, a positive slope κ should be estimated, even without controlling for supply shocks. Similarly, for supply-driven inflation, since the variation in inflation stemming from demand is stripped out, the slope should be estimated as negative.

Shocks to inflation expectations, markups and import prices are both inflationary and recessionary (stagflation), so they are all considered as standard supply shocks.²⁴ So, it is expected to see a significant impact of inflation expectations and import prices on the supply-driven inflation. On the contrary, the impact on demand-driven should be much weaker.

²⁴See [Ascari et al. \(2023\)](#) for inflation expectations, [Smets and Wouters \(2003\)](#) for markups, and [Blanchard and Gali \(2007\)](#); [de Walque et al. \(2005\)](#) for import prices.

Table-1 demonstrates that the estimated coefficients align with theoretical expectations. Inflation expectations and import price inflation both induce a significant increase in supply-driven inflation. When firms set their own prices, they incorporate their inflation expectations into pricing due to the staggered nature of price setting. Aware that they cannot frequently change prices, firms reflect these anticipated future increases in marginal costs in their pricing today.²⁵ This practice aligns with the principle that firm pricing equals the discounted sum of marginal costs, akin to Calvo-type price setting. Import price inflation contributes to higher marginal costs, given its substantial share in production costs.²⁶ Costlier production leads to higher supply-driven inflation. As originally targeted, the relationship between real activity and inflation is negative, meaning that supply-driven inflation captures supply-side factors affecting the economy, causing prices and the output gap to move in opposite directions. Estimating the model using supply-driven inflation yields a negative slope (-0.055), which should mechanically hold if the decomposition is successful.

In the case of demand-driven inflation, a steep positive Phillips curve (0.056) is estimated, whereas it becomes flatter and insignificant when aggregate inflation is used (0.035), indicating the downward bias created by supply shocks.²⁷ Changes in inflation expectations, import price inflation, and markup shocks alter the Phillips Curve, shifting the equilibrium output gap and inflation in opposite directions, thereby complicating their structural relationship. This actually represents the standard challenge in estimating structural, simultaneous relations. When these supply side pressures are removed from the estimation, the Phillips Curve relationship appears to be much stronger. As can be seen from the coefficients, the bias is economically strong.

Inflation expectations exert differing impacts on demand- and supply-driven inflation rates. While expectations significantly influence supply-driven inflation, we do not observe a significant coefficient in the case of demand-driven inflation. A 1 percentage point increase in inflation ex-

²⁵Frequency of price changes is actually an increasing function of inflation, see [Alvarez et al. \(2018\)](#).

²⁶Imports are not only used in final consumption, but also in production as intermediate inputs. The import share in production is close to 20% in Türkiye ([Erduman et al., 2020](#)).

²⁷Downward bias is even stronger if we use firms' inflation expectations instead of professionals' in the model. See [Table-A2](#).

expectations transmits to supply-driven inflation as a 0.30 percentage point. The sum of estimated coefficients for lags of inflation is nearly 0.60, underscoring the importance of adaptive expectations (expectations based on lagged experience).²⁸ Import price inflation demonstrates a significant impact as a cost-push factor, with the contemporaneous pass-through rate to supply-driven inflation hovering around 8.5%.²⁹ However, this pass-through effect is considerably weaker on demand-driven inflation, since the demand for imports is lower and also indirectly for domestic goods due to lower purchasing power, as the currency depreciates. On the other hand, inflation expectations show no significant impact on demand-driven inflation.³⁰

Demand-driven inflation displays high autocorrelation, with the sum of coefficients for lagged inflation around 0.80. According to the Euler equation (dynamic IS curve), higher inflation expectations and subsequently lower perceived real rates should lead to increased consumption by agents, thereby likely driving demand-driven inflation.³¹ However, the front-loaded consumption, stockpiling channel in the case of higher inflation expectations is not captured. One reason might be the fact that expectations data based on professional forecasters does not accurately reflect the expectations of households, which is documented to be higher and also more sensitive to gasoline and food prices (Coibion et al., 2020).³² Another possibility is that since hand-to-mouth agents, who are myopic and consume what they earn, constitute a large share of the population (Kaplan et al., 2014), we do not observe the impact of forward-looking behavior consequently. They are liquidity constrained or unable to borrow such that intertemporal substitution effect from Euler equation cannot be observed for these agents. Moreover, since higher future inflation is effectively a tax on nominal assets, higher inflation expectations can capture negative wealth effect, which might create downward pressure on current consumption. From the perspective

²⁸Sum of the coefficients of the backward and forward-looking inflation terms is close to 1 in each specification.

²⁹The results are robust to different number of lags as controls in supply-driven inflation regressions.

³⁰Using firms' expectations, the coefficient becomes significant, though the magnitude remains small, as shown in Table-A2.

³¹That is the main motivation behind forward guidance to raise inflation expectations. Through higher inflation expectations and being more optimistic about economic activity would lead to a higher aggregate demand today.

³²Recently, the CBRT published households' and firms' inflation expectations data, and the data has been available since 2015. Using households' expectations instead does not make the coefficient significant.

of debtors, inflation erodes the real value of the debt, which creates positive wealth effect. Also, households associate high expected inflation with a negative future economic growth and hold a stagflationary view of inflation (Kamdar, 2019; Coibion et al., 2023). So, consequently their income growth expectations are lower and they might even decrease their consumption as a response to higher inflation expectations.³³ Also, due to the stickier nature of wages, households might expect that in the short run, wages will not keep pace with rising prices, resulting in a negative income effect. However, as a result of nominal illusion, household might be inclined to increase their current consumption even if the expected income growth would not keep pace with inflation. Additionally, higher inflationary environment is associated with higher uncertainty (Binder, 2017). This might induce a reduction in consumption due to precautionary savings motives. At the same time, higher inflation expectation might increase the cost of future borrowing, so households stock up on debt with fixed-rates and increase durable consumption today (Ryn-gaert, 2022). All these channels related to inflation expectations might impact consumption decisions and there are conflicting empirical evidence in the literature. Therefore, it is not clear the impact of inflation expectation on the aggregate demand-driven inflation.³⁴

A flat Phillips curve implies a higher sacrifice ratio, indicating the cost required to return inflation to its target, or a weak link between real activity and inflation. The latter interpretation suggests a lack of short-run policy trade-off between real activity and inflation, this might make policy makers overlook the natural rate hypothesis (Cogley and Sargent, 2001).³⁵ However, this is not the case in Türkiye. The strength of the relationship between real activity and demand-driven inflation is significant: the slope of the Phillips Curve, κ , is -0.250 and comparable to the estimates with aggregate inflation in the literature (Gordon, 2013; Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2015; McLeay and Tenreiro, 2020). Nevertheless, the standard demand channel alone cannot

³³Hajdini et al. (2022) document that an increase in short-term inflation expectation does not fully transmit to expected income growth.

³⁴A more granular data is required to test these different channels. For example, the intertemporal substitution might be more observable for durable goods compared to nondurables.

³⁵Like in 1970s in the U.S., the reason for inflation hike might be supply shocks leading to the unanchored inflation expectations and taming the expectations might induce a significant decline in inflation rate without needing a very high real contraction as "sacrifice ratio" suggests.

fully explain the high inflation spikes observed in the data. Cost-push shocks and unanchored inflation expectations play significant roles. Additionally, the relationship between inflation and real activity may exhibit nonlinear characteristics (see [Benigno and Eggertsson \(2023\)](#)), which is beyond the scope of this paper. Overall, the Phillips Curve dynamics are highly consistent with the decomposition conducted in a high and volatile inflation environment, further enhancing the validity of the exercise.

5 Dynamic Response of Supply- and Demand-Driven Inflation to Exogenous Shocks

To see whether the demand-driven and supply-driven inflation are consistent with the theory, we estimate the response of constructed inflation rates to exogenous aggregate shocks, such as monetary policy shocks and oil supply shocks. A positive monetary policy shock should reduce inflation via a reduction in demand, thus we should observe a significant decrease in demand-driven component. A negative oil supply shock should increase the marginal cost of production, therefore we should observe a significant increase in supply-driven component. If both externally-constructed supply and demand shocks move components of inflation in anticipated directions, we can be more confident about the accuracy of the methodology used in the paper.

To assess these channels, we use the local projection method of [Jorda \(2005\)](#) and estimate the following specification:

$$\pi_{t+h}^j = c + \beta_j^h OilSS_t + \gamma_j^h \sum_{k=1}^6 Z_t + \epsilon_t \quad (3)$$

where $OilSS_t$ stands for oil supply shocks from [Känzig \(2021\)](#). The dependent variable π_{t+h}^j is the cumulative growth in the supply-driven or demand-driven ($j \in \{sup, dem\}$) inflation between period t and $t+h$. The vector of controls Z_t includes the percent change in the exchange rate to account for exchange rate pass-through, the log VIX index to control for global financial condi-

tions, lags of the dependent variable, as well as lags of shocks.³⁶

Figure-4 presents the response of demand-driven and supply-driven inflation to oil supply shock. A one standard deviation increase oil supply shock increases supply-driven inflation by a cumulative 0.8 percentage point over 9 months, the pass-through effect of oil prices is evident. The response of demand-driven inflation is insignificant over the short horizon and the same shock induces a slight decrease in demand-driven inflation in the long horizon, which is consistent with the fact that energy price increases leading to negative demand shock in a longer horizon (Edelstein and Kilian, 2009).³⁷ The effect is significantly larger on supply-driven inflation and therefore oil supply shock has a positive impact on overall inflation (see Figure-A6).




Figure 4: Response of Inflation to Oil Supply Shock

Notes: Light and dark gray areas are the 90th percentile and one-standard deviation confidence bands. Newey-West standard errors are used. Oil supply shocks are retrieved from Känzig (2021). The sample period covers 2011m12-2019m12.

The following specification is used to estimate the responses of inflation components to monetary policy shocks:

$$\pi_{t+h}^j = c + \beta_j^h MPS_t + \gamma_j^h \sum_{k=1}^6 Z_t + \epsilon_t \quad (4)$$

where MPS_t stands for monetary policy shocks from Bauer and Swanson (2023). Similar to above, the dependent variable π_{t+h}^j is the cumulative growth in the supply-driven or demand-driven ($j \in \{sup, dem\}$) inflation between period t and $t+h$. The vector of controls Z_t stays the same.

³⁶Due to data limitations, we use six lags as controls; however, the results are robust to alternative lag specifications.

³⁷This finding is similar to what Shapiro (2022) documented for the U.S.

Figure-5 presents the response of demand-driven and supply-driven inflation to monetary policy shock. A one standard deviation increase U.S. monetary policy shock decreases demand-driven inflation by a cumulative 1.5 percentage point over 7 months, which is consistent with standard NK models, i.e. tightening leads to a reduction in demand-driven inflation via dampening of demand. The response of supply-driven inflation to monetary policy shock is insignificant and muted over 18 months.³⁸ These findings are consistent with the large literature on global financial cycles, which shows the spillover impact of U.S. monetary shocks on both emerging and advanced economies.³⁹ Since the demand channel dominates, monetary policy shock has a negative impact on overall inflation as shown in Figure-A2.




Figure 5: Response of Inflation to Monetary Policy Shock

Notes: Light and dark gray areas are the 90th percentile and one-standard deviation confidence bands. Newey-West standard errors are used. Monetary policy shocks are retrieved from [Bauer and Swanson \(2023\)](#). The sample period covers 2011m12-2019m12 due to MP shock availability.

Both supply- and demand-driven inflation rates move in anticipated directions against exogenous oil supply and monetary policy shocks. This improves the validity of the decomposition approach used. The decomposition allows us to capture underlying supply and demand effects accurately. Overall, the evidence on dynamic responses of economic variables are consistent with

³⁸There might be some impact on supply-driven inflation if there is a pass-through from higher costs of capital to consumer prices, in case of monetary tightening. U.S. monetary shock increases funding cost of firms globally via rising corporate bond spreads ([Miranda-Agrippino and Rey, 2020](#)). However, this is one cost-channel of monetary policy and other cost-channels might be more important for Turkish firms. To capture cost-channel accurately, one needs to use monetary policy shocks created for Türkiye.

³⁹For the literature, see [Miranda-Agrippino and Rey \(2020\)](#); [Bräuning and Ivashina \(2020\)](#); [Iacoviello and Navarro \(2019\)](#); [Dedola et al. \(2017\)](#); [Bruno and Shin \(2015\)](#).

the Phillips Curve estimation presented in previous section. The findings are consistent with the economic theory.

Lastly, [Taylor \(2000\)](#) posits that the declines in pass-through to aggregate prices can be attributed to a low inflation environment.⁴⁰ Taylor’s explanation hinges on a model of firm behavior characterized by staggered price setting and monopolistic competition. According to this model, firms setting prices for several periods in advance are more likely to adjust prices in response to cost increases (such as those caused by exchange rate depreciation) if they perceive these cost changes to be persistent. Essentially, firms calculate the discounted sum of future marginal costs due to staggered price settings, as in Calvo pricing models, and if costs are persistent, the pass-through effect is likely to be stronger. In high inflation regimes, costs tend to be more persistent, leading to a higher exchange rate pass-through. This is particularly relevant for Türkiye, making it important to assess the impact of pass-through on supply- and demand-driven inflation separately.

We define an exchange rate shock in the spirit of uncertainty shocks of [Bloom \(2009\)](#), where shocks are defined as events when the peak of a series rises significantly above the mean. In this context, exchange rate shocks are essentially monthly percentage changes in the exchange rate (USD/TRY) that deviate by more than one standard deviation from the series’ mean.⁴¹ So, the identification comes only from these large, and arguably unexpected, exchange rate shocks rather than from the smaller fluctuations.

$$\pi_{t+h}^j = c + \beta_j^h ExchRateShock_t + \gamma_j^h \sum_{k=1}^6 Z_t + \epsilon_t \quad (5)$$

where $ExchRateShock_t$ stands for exchange rate shocks. Similar to above, the dependent vari-

⁴⁰Most prior empirical research on the relationship between exchange rate pass-through and inflation, as demonstrated in studies by [Calvo and Reinhart \(2002\)](#), [Campa and Goldberg \(2005\)](#), [Choudhri and Hakura \(2006\)](#), [Gagnon \(2009\)](#), [Devereux and Yetman \(2010\)](#), [Auer and Schoenle \(2016\)](#), and [Hobijn et al. \(2021\)](#) has explored this dynamic extensively.

⁴¹The threshold is one standard deviation above the mean, selected as the 16% one-tailed significance level, treating each month as an independent observation. According to this criterion, there are 18 months with positive exchange rate shocks within the 2010-2024 period.

able π_{t+h}^j is the cumulative growth in the supply-driven or demand-driven ($j \in \{sup, dem\}$) inflation between period t and $t + h$. The vector of controls Z_t includes the log VIX index to control for global financial conditions, lags of the dependent variable, as well as lags of shocks.




Figure 6: Response of Inflation to Exchange-Rate Shock

Notes: Light and dark gray areas are the 90th percentile and one-standard deviation confidence bands. Newey-West standard errors are used. Exchange rate shocks are defined as monthly percentage changes in the exchange rate (USD/TRY) that deviate by more than one standard deviation from the series' mean. The sample period covers 2011m12-2023m12.

Both supply- and demand-driven inflation rates respond to exchange rate shocks. The strong response of supply-driven inflation is due to increasing pressure on prices resulting from higher import costs, while the relatively weaker response of demand-driven inflation can be attributed to the wealth effect stemming from the high dollarization rate in Türkiye.

6 Conclusion

This paper offers a straightforward yet insightful decomposition of the inflation rate into supply- and demand-driven components, following the methodology of [Shapiro \(2022\)](#). While supply-driven inflation was initially predominant during the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, demand-driven inflation began to rise due to an accommodative monetary policy stance and loose fiscal policies. Notably, after the rate cuts in the fourth quarter of 2021, supply-driven inflation surged due to a sharp depreciation of the currency and unanchored inflation expectations, accompanied by an increase in demand-driven inflation fueled by negative real interest rates and credit expan-

sion. With the rate hike cycle that began in the summer of 2023 and peaked at 50% in March 2024, demand-driven inflation has started to decline as the economy slows with the hawkish stance.

This decomposition aligns with narrative evidence, empirical analysis, and theoretical understanding, providing a real-time indicator of the economy's performance. It enables the tracking of the impacts of monetary and fiscal policies and the different channels influencing demand- and supply-driven inflation. We hope this approach will serve as a valuable tool for policymakers and market participants.

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Appendix - A - Additional Results




Figure A1: Response of Oil price and quantity to Oil Supply Shock

Notes: Bold lines show the cumulative impulse responses of the log oil price index and log oil quantity index to the oil supply shock. Light areas are the 90th percentile confidence bands. Newey-West standard errors are used. The sample period covers 2011m12-2024m2.

Figure-A6 shows that oil supply shocks of [Känzig \(2021\)](#) induce anticipated impacts on oil quantity and prices in Türkiye. A negative oil supply shock leads to an increase in oil prices and a decrease in quantity consumed. This is an evidence for the validity of the oil supply shocks.






Figure A2: Response of Retail Inflation to Shocks

Notes: Bold lines show the cumulative impulse responses of the retail inflation to the oil supply and monetary policy shock. Light areas are the 90th percentile confidence bands. Newey-West standard errors are used. Estimation sample is 2011-2023 for oil supply shock and 2011-2019 for monetary policy shock.

Figure-A2 shows the response of retail inflation to supply and demand side shocks.




(a) Benchmark




(b) Ambiguity version

Figure A3: Supply- and demand-driven Inflation (Hamilton Filter)

Notes: The 12-month change in retail inflation is divided into contributions determined as supply-driven (blue), demand-driven (red), and ambiguous (gray). The sample period covers 2011m12-2024m2. The price and quantity indexes are filtered using the Hamilton (2018) filter before running the main estimation.




(a) Benchmark




(b) Ambiguity version

Figure A4: Supply- and demand-driven Inflation (with retail weights)

Notes: The 12-month change in retail inflation is divided into contributions determined as supply-driven (blue), demand-driven (red), and ambiguous (gray). The sample period covers 2011m12-2024m2. Instead of CPI weights, retail weights are used in this specification.



(a) 24 lags



(b) No time trends

Figure A5: Supply- and demand-driven Inflation (alternative specifications)

Notes: The 12-month change in retail inflation is divided into contributions determined as supply-driven (blue) and demand-driven (red). The sample period covers 2011m12-2024m2. In panel-a, 24 lags of dependent variable is used instead of 12 lags. In panel-b, linear and quadratic time trends are not included in the main estimation.






Figure A6: Supply- and Demand-Driven Inflation


Notes: The 12-month change in retail inflation is divided into contributions determined as supply-driven (blue) and demand-driven (red). The sample period covers 2011m12-2024m2. The residuals from the price and quantity regressions are obtained using the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation. In this process, we use the one-month exchange rate shock as an instrument for the exchange rate, following the approach of Bloom (2009) to create uncertainty shocks. This method addresses the endogeneity concerns associated with the exchange rate.




(a) 2012m12-2024m2



(b) 2015m12-2024m2



(c) 2012m12-2020m12



(d) 2019m12-2024m2

Figure A7: Supply- and demand-driven Inflation for different subsamples
 Notes: The 12-month change in retail inflation is divided into contributions determined as supply-driven (blue) and demand-driven (red). Instead of CPI weights, retail weights are used in this specification.




Figure A8: Supply- and demand-driven Inflation (by sector)

Notes: The 12-month change in retail inflation is divided into contributions determined as supply-driven (blue) and demand-driven (red). The sample period covers 2011m12-2024m2. The main estimation is run for each sector separately. The sample period covers 2011m12-2024m2.

Panel A: Supply Driven Contributions								
	No Ambiguity					Ambiguity		
	Benchmark	H.Filter	No time trend	24lags	Retail weights	Benchmark	H.Filter	Retail weights
Benchmark	1.000							
H.Filter	0.9624	1.000						
No time trend	0.9592	0.9387	1.000					
24lags	0.9782	0.9266	0.9243	1.000				
Retail weights	0.9837	0.9423	0.9180	0.9790	1.000			
Ambiguity (Benchmark)	0.9849	0.9209	0.9611	0.9689	0.9688	1.000		
Ambiguity (H.Filter)	0.9713	0.9830	0.9568	0.9510	0.9527	0.9502	1.000	
Ambiguity (Retail weights)	0.9670	0.9088	0.9151	0.9693	0.9881	0.9772	0.9362	1.000

Panel B: Demand Driven Contributions								
	No Ambiguity					Ambiguity		
	Benchmark	H.Filter	No time trend	24lags	Retail weights	Benchmark	H.Filter	Retail weights
Benchmark	1.000							
H.Filter	0.9600	1.000						
No time trend	0.9426	0.9238	1.000					
24lags	0.9586	0.9034	0.8907	1.000				
Retail weights	0.9871	0.9268	0.9268	0.9691	1.000			
Ambiguity (Benchmark)	0.9733	0.9369	0.9691	0.9397	0.9598	1.000		
Ambiguity (H.Filter)	0.9196	0.9768	0.9214	0.8549	0.8807	0.9120	1.000	
Ambiguity (Retail weights)	0.9457	0.8748	0.9493	0.9395	0.9629	0.9780	0.8334	1.000

Table A1: Cross-correlations between the alternative measures of supply- and demand-driven contributions

Notes: The displayed data showcases the contemporaneous correlations of contributions to 12-month inflation under the various specifications. Benchmark employs a benchmark specification incorporating 12 lags of price and quantity, alongside time trends. In contrast, H.Filter applies Hamilton (2018) filter to log price and log quantity prior to estimation, with a 24-month horizon. No time trend omits time trends from consideration. 24 lags extends the analysis by incorporating 24 lags of price and quantity. Retail weights adopts retail price index weights instead of inflation weights for the sector. The ambiguous component encompasses categories where the residual from either the price or quantity regression deviated by less than 0.1 sector-specific standard deviations from zero. Ambiguity(Benchmark), Ambiguity (H.Filter) and Ambiguity (Retail weights) utilize these ambiguity components by incorporating benchmark regression, Hamilton filter and retail weights, respectively. The sample period covers 2011m12-2024m4.

	(1) Inflation	(2) Supply-Inf	(3) Demand-Inf	(4) Inflation	(5) Supply-Inf	(6) Demand-Inf
$\sum_{j=1}^{11} \pi_{t-j}$	0.360*** (0.054)	0.501*** (0.124)	0.713*** (0.093)	0.364*** (0.053)	0.393*** (0.148)	0.482*** (0.156)
$E_t \pi_{t+1}$	0.600*** (0.068)	0.234*** (0.063)	0.081** (0.040)	0.589*** (0.065)	0.308*** (0.085)	0.173*** (0.065)
π_t^m	0.144*** (0.016)	0.089*** (0.019)	0.031*** (0.005)	0.146*** (0.016)	0.082*** (0.018)	0.029*** (0.005)
x_t	0.010 (0.043)	-0.071*** (0.022)	0.059*** (0.022)			
Unemployment				-0.193 (0.235)	0.519** (0.225)	-0.657*** (0.207)
Observations	114	114	114	114	114	114
R^2	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.98

Table A2: Slope of the Phillips Curve: A Comparison of Demand- and Supply-Driven Inflation

Notes: Entries are coefficients and standard errors from estimating regression (2). Newey-West standard errors are in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. x_t represents the output gap, obtained from retail sales data using the Hamilton filter. π_t^m denotes import inflation, and $E_t \pi_{t+1}$ represents 12-month ahead inflation expectations of firms. "Supply-Inf" refers to the supply-driven component of inflation, while "Demand-Inf" refers to the demand-driven component. The sample period covers 2015m1-2024m6.

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