Export Pass-Through, Imported Inputs and Domestic Supply Networks

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Motivation

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- Well-identified micro-level evidence from Turkey: product-level customs data, domestic firm-to-firm sales, balance sheets for the universe of Turkish exporters.
- Period: 2006-2016. Final Sample: ${\sim}72K$ exporting firms, ${\sim}800K$ suppliers.

Contribution

Literature on export price pass-through and use of imports:

- Amiti, Itskhoki, Konings (2014, AER): Exporters with higher reliance on imports raise their export prices more following an ER depreciation, i.e., higher price pass-through (Belgium)
 - Heterogeneity in pass-through: Goldberg and Hellerstein (2008); Market structure: Auer and Schoenle (2016), Productivity: Berman, Martin, Mayer (2012); Quality of exports: Chen and Juvenal (2016); Incomplete information: Garetto (2016).

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Contribution #1

Incorporating exporters' supply network (in particular, exporters' suppliers' reliance on imports) into the picture.

Contribution (cnt'd)

Literature on supply networks:

- idiosyncratic shocks \Rightarrow aggregate outcomes:
 - ··· Acemoglu et al., 2016; Carvalho and Tahbaz-Salehi, 2018.
- firm-to-firm spillovers through domestic supply network:
 - natural disasters (Barrot and Sauvagnat, 2016); trade shocks (Tintelnot et al., 2017); infrastructure (Bernard et al., 2017); financial shocks (Demir-Pakel et al. 2018).

Contribution #2

The role of supply network for pricing; and export dynamics.

Definitions and terms

Exchange rate pass-through to export prices:

- Sensitivity of exports to exchange rate movements
 - \cdots Local currency pricing (e.g., USD, Euro)
 - Producer currency pricing (TL)

Example:

- 1TL = \$1 at $t \rightarrow 1.1$ TL = \$1 at t + 1 (a 10% depreciation in TL)...
- 100% pass-through in **producer currency** if the unit price of the good goes from 10 TL at t to 11 TL at t + 1.

What we find?

Suppliers' import intensity is a key part of the picture!

- **1** 64% of exporters import directly vs. 99% use imported inputs once we include suppliers.
- **2** Exporters' import intensity: 22% (own) \Rightarrow 45% (own+suppliers)

Suppliers' import intensity matters for the export pass-through!

3 Exporters that rely more on imports, directly or through their suppliers, increase their export prices significantly more and their export volumes significantly less following an exchange rate depreciation.

Market power at domestic supply markets matters!

4 Exporters that work with only a few suppliers have higher price pass-through.

Greater domestic supply chain disruptions!

5 Exporters that rely more on import-intensive suppliers have fewer suppliers, fewer new suppliers and lose a greater number of suppliers following an ER depreciation.

Data

Data

- Exports: Firm-product(CN8)-destination(country) level export value and amount.
- Imports: Firm-product(CN8)-destination(country) level import value and amount.
- Network: Domestic firm-to-firm sales.
- Balance Sheets: Firm-level balance sheets.

Our final sample consists of 72,610 exporters and their "nearly" complete supply network (up to 3rd degree: all of their suppliers and their suppliers' suppliers, a total of 813,261 supplier firms).

What is product *i* ?

6403			Footwear with outer soles of rubber, plastics, leather or composition leather and uppers of leather:	Dış tabanı kauçuktan, plastik maddeden, tabii veya terkip yoluyla elde edilen köseleden ve yüzü deriden olan ayakkabılar:
			- Sports footwear:	 Spor ayakkabıları:
		64031200	 - Ski-boots, cross-country ski footwear and snowboard boots 	 - Kayak ayakkabıları , kuzey disiplini kayak ayakkabıları ve kar sörfü için ayakkabılar
		64031900	Other	Diğerleri
		64032000	 Footwear with outer soles of leather, and uppers which consist of leather straps across the instep and around the big toe 	- Dış tabanı tabii köseleden ve yüzü ayağın üstünden geçip baş parmağa dolanan deri bir şeritten olan ayakkabılar
		64034000	- Other footwear, incorporating a protective metal toecap	- Diğer ayakkabılar (metalden koruyucu burnu olanlar)
			 Other footwear with outer soles of leather: 	 Diğer ayakkabılar (dış tabanı tabii köseleden olanlar):
	640351		Covering the ankle:	 Bileği örtenler:
		64035105	 Made on a base or platform of wood, not having an inner sole 	 İç tabanı olmayan, ahşap mesnet veya platform üzerine yapılmış olanlar
			Other:	Diğerleri :
			Covering the ankle but no part of the calf, with insoles of a length:	Bileği örten fakat baldırı örtmeyenler, iç taban uzunluğu:
		64035111	Of less than 24 cm	24 cm. den az olanlar
			Of 24 cm or more:	İç tabanının uzunluğu 24 cm. veya daha fazla olanlar:
		64035115	For men	Erkekler için
		64035119	For women	Kadınlar için
			Other, with insoles of a length:	Diğerleri, iç taban uzunluğu:
		64035191	Of less than 24 cm	24 cm. den az olanlar
		0.1005.105	Of 24 cm or more:	İç tabanının uzunluğu 24 cm. veya daha fazla olanlar:

Domestic supply network of exporters

Exporters have many import-intensive suppliers.



Source: GBS, Ministry of Treasury and Finance. LEGEND: • Non-Exporter • Exporter Bigger circle: Higher reliance on imports



Finding 1: Almost all exporters import

An exporter's probability of using imported goods



Finding 2: Exporters are in fact much more import-intensive once their suppliers are taken into account.

Kernel density estimates of exporters' import intensity



Finding 2 (cont'd): Exporters are in fact much more import intensive once their suppliers are taken into account (22% vs. 45%)



Evolution of exporters' import intensity

Exporters vs. their suppliers vs. non-exporters

- Few exporters.
- Exporters are larger and more productive than their suppliers.
- Exporters' suppliers are larger and more productive than non-exporters.

	Exporters	Suppliers	Non-Exporters
Prob. of being an importer	0.64	0.16	0.06
Prob. of being an importer (agg)	0.99		
Employment	38.68	11.41	5.18
Net sales (log)	14.73	13.43	12.57
Sales per employment (000s, TL)	1117.44	683.09	577.18
Cost of sales (log)	14.52	13.15	12.27
Ν	72,610	813,261	1,603,575

Empirical Strategy and Identification

The effect of import intensity of exporter f on its export price of product i to country k following an ER depreciation ?

Main Specification

$$\Delta p_{f,i,k,t} = \left(\beta_1 \varphi_{f,t-1}^1 + \beta_2 \varphi_{f,t-1}^2 + \beta_3 \varphi_{f,t-1}^3 + \alpha S_{f,s,k,t-1}\right) \Delta e_{kt} + \dots$$
$$\dots + \delta_{s,k,t} + u_{f,i,k,t}$$

given the demand for sector (CN-4) s of destination country k at year t.

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•
$$\Delta p_{f,i,k,t} \equiv \Delta log\left(\frac{\text{Export value}_{f,i,k,t}}{\text{Export quantity}_{f,i,k,t}}\right)$$
; price \approx unit value at CN 8-digit

- $\varphi_{f,t}^1$: First-order Import Intensity
- $\varphi_{f,t}^2$: Second-order Import Intensity: Import intensity of exporter f due to its suppliers
- $\varphi_{f,t}^3$: Third-order Import Intensity: ... due to its suppliers' suppliers
- $S_{f,s,k,t}$: Market share of exporter f at the destination-sector(CN-4)-year
- $\delta_{s,k,t}$: Destination-sector-year F.E.s: demand-side effects or common shocks to marginal costs across these exporters.

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Identification is based on

• the cross-sectional variation in the import intensity of firms that export the same 4-digit good to the same destination country at the same year.

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- $\varphi \rightleftharpoons \Delta e_{kt}$? Do exporters change their import intensities due to changes in ER? No! R^2 of 91% for the regression: import intensities on firm fixed effects.

Definitions: Import Intensities and Export Market Share

$$\varphi_{f,t}^{1} \equiv \frac{\sum_{c \in C_{f,t}} \sum_{i \in I_{f,t}} \operatorname{Import Value}_{f,i,c,t}}{\operatorname{Cost of Sales}_{f,t}} = \frac{\operatorname{Import Value}_{f,t}}{\operatorname{Cost of Sales}_{f,t}}$$
$$\varphi_{f,t}^{2} \equiv \frac{\operatorname{Supplier Purchases}_{f,t}}{\operatorname{Cost of Sales}_{f,t}} \sum_{n=1}^{N_{f,t}} w_{f,n,t} \frac{\operatorname{Import Value}_{n,f,t}}{\operatorname{Cost of Sales}_{n,f,t}}$$
$$\varphi_{f,t}^{3} \equiv \frac{\operatorname{Supplier Purchases}_{f,t}}{\operatorname{Cost of Sales}_{f,t}} \sum_{n=1}^{N_{f,t}} w_{f,n,t} \left[\frac{\operatorname{Supplier Purchases}_{n,t}}{\operatorname{Cost of Sales}_{n,t}} \left(\sum_{m=1}^{M_{n,t}} w_{n,m,t} \frac{\operatorname{Import Value}_{n,m,t}}{\operatorname{Cost of Sales}_{n,m,t}} \right) \right]$$

$$\varphi_{f,t}^{agg} \equiv \varphi_{f,t}^1 + \varphi_{f,t}^2 + \varphi_{f,t}^3 \le 1$$

$$S_{f,s,k,t} \equiv \frac{\text{Export Value}_{f,s,k,t}}{\sum_{f' \in F_{s,k,t}} \text{Export Value}_{f',s,k,t}}$$

Empirical Results

Empirical Results: Baseline

- 10% depreciation $\Rightarrow \approx 2.2\%$ increase in export prices (TL).
- High market share \Rightarrow higher pass-through \checkmark
- First-order import-intensity (p90-p10): the price pass-through is higher (by 27%)

Dependent variable: Log-change in export price ($\Delta P_{f,i,k,t}$)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
$\Delta \text{ER}_{k,t} ^*$ First-order Import Intensity	0.0463** (0.0233)	0.1026*** (0.0220)	0.1206*** (0.0232)	0.1311*** (0.0240)	
$\Delta \text{ER}_{k,t} ^*$ Export Market Share	0.1025*** (0.0207)	0.0825*** (0.0254)	0.0761*** (0.0252)	0.0761*** (0.0252)	0.0758*** (0.0252)
$\Delta \text{ER}_{k,t} ^{\star}$ Second-order Import Intensity			0.1385*** (0.0330)	0.1327*** (0.0324)	
$\Delta \operatorname{ER}_{k,t}$ * Third-order Import Intensity				0.3034** (0.1316)	
$\Delta \text{ER}_{k,t} ^{\star} \text{Aggregate Import Intensity}$					0.1303*** (0.0224)
$\Delta ER_{k,t}$	0.2187*** (0.0185)				. ,
Destination x Sector and Year FE	Yes				
Destination x Sector x Year FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,237,893	3,237,893	3,237,893	3,237,893	3,237,893
R-squared	0.030	0.106	0.106	0.106	0.106

Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the destination x year level, and given in parantheses. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, and * significant at 10%.

Empirical Results: Baseline

- If you rely more on import-intensive suppliers: an additional 16% higher price pass-through.
- If you rely more on suppliers who rely more on import-intensive suppliers: an additional 10% higher price pass-through.
- Including suppliers' import intensities (second and third-order import intensities combined) adds up to **30% higher price pass-through** compared to the first-order.

Dependent variable: Log-change in export price ($\Delta P_{f,i,k,t}$)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
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 - \cdots Stronger results \checkmark

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- ④ Firms produce many products, and for each, the production technology (and import use) may differ?
 - \cdots Focusing on main export products (at CN 2-digit) \checkmark
 - \cdots Smaller effects \leftrightarrow exporters are less competitive outside their main products. \checkmark

- High-quality exports (above median price at destination-good (CN-8) level)√
- 6 Bilateral exchange rate (for all ER vis-a-vis destination-k currency) \checkmark
- ⑦ A coarse definition for goods CN 4-digit√
- 8 Exports to the Euro-area √

Further Insights:

- 1 Imported intermediate goods (CN \leftrightarrow BEC classification) \checkmark
- 2 Export volume (amount) \checkmark , export value (price×volume) \checkmark

Results are strongly robust.

Specification:	Baseline	Weighted LS	Time-varying Import Intensity ($\vartheta_f \equiv \vartheta_{f,t}$)	Wholesale Traders (Emp < 10)	Main Export Products	High Quality Products	Bilateral Exchange Rate	CN 4-digit	Euro-area Countries
Dependent variable: Log-change in export price (ΔP _{t,i,k,t})	(0)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\Delta \text{ER}_{k,t}^{*}$ First-order Import Intensity	0.1311*** (0.0240)	0.1290*** (0.0227)	0.1108*** (0.0207)	0.1574*** (0.0571)	0.0933*** (0.0259)	0.1457*** (0.0323)	0.1514*** (0.0237)	0.0786*** (0.0257)	0.0184 (0.0462)
$\Delta \text{ER}_{k,t}^{*}$ Export Market Share	0.0761*** (0.0252)	0.0643*** (0.0246)	0.0799**** (0.0252)	0.2034*** (0.0666)	0.0700**** (0.0269)	0.1534*** (0.0376)	0.1309**** (0.0256)	0.0852*** (0.0287)	0.3059**** (0.0576)
$\Delta ER_{k,t}^{*}$ Second-order Import Intensity	0.1327*** (0.0324)	0.1165*** (0.0319)	0.0828*** (0.0281)	0.1690*** (0.0611)	0.0978*** (0.0374)	0.1190** (0.0467)	0.1570 *** (0.0334)	0.0983*** (0.0367)	0.1451** (0.0671)
$\Delta ER_{k,t}$ * Third-order Import Intensity	0.3034** (0.1316)	0.3041** (0.1275)	0.2523** (0.1021)	0.1162 (0.2127)	0.0776 (0.1592)	0.1242 (0.1565)	0.3537** (0.1382)	0.1369 (0.1587)	0.1899 (0.3044)
Destination x Sector x Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations R-squared	3,237,893 0.106	3,237,893 0.110	3,237,893 0.106	937,670 0.148	2,386,320 0.120	1,549,541 0.142	3,237,893 0.106	1,655,343 0.175	785,801 0.097

Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the destination x year level, and given in parantheses. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, and * significant at 10%.

Robust to using Intermediate Import Goods

	Specification:	Baseline	Weighted LS	Time-varying Import Intensity ($\vartheta_f \equiv \vartheta_{ft}$)	Wholesale Traders (Emp < 10)	Main Export Products	High Quality Products	Bilateral Exchange Rate	CN 4-digit	Euro-area countries
Dependent variable: Log-change in export price (ΔP _{f,ik,t})		(0)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\Delta \text{ER}_{k,t}$ * First-order Import Intensity		0.1184*** (0.0231)	0.1208*** (0.0220)	0.0998*** (0.0201)	0.1242** (0.0584)	0.0669** (0.0262)	0.154*** (0.0344)	0.1337*** (0.0232)	0.0679** (0.0273)	-0.0102 (0.0438)
$\Delta \text{ER}_{k,t}$ * Export Market Share		0.0778*** (0.0252)	0.0657*** (0.0246)	0.0813*** (0.0253)	0.2123*** (0.0665)	0.0736*** (0.0265)	0.1376*** (0.0389)	0.1318*** (0.0255)	0.0833*** (0.0288)	0.3128*** (0.0576)
$\Delta \text{ER}_{k,t}$ * Second-order Import Intensity		0.1244*** (0.0320)	0.1095*** (0.0315)	0.0757*** (0.0280)	0.1579*** (0.0612)	0.0716* (0.0371)	0.1272** (0.0508)	0.1456*** (0.0329)	0.0920** (0.0363)	0.1421** (0.0675)
$\Delta \text{ER}_{k,t}$ * Third-order Import Intensity		0.3087** (0.1305)	0.3125** (0.1261)	0.2501** (0.1014)	0.0400 (0.2125)	0.0698 (0.1601)	0.0765 (0.1701)	0.3515*** (0.1362)	0.1421 (0.1559)	0.1566 (0.3225)
Destination x Sector x Year FE		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations R-squared		3,263,355 0.105	3,263,355 0.110	3,263,355 0.106	941,752 0.148	2,430,636 0.118	1,432,961 0.148	3,263,355 0.105	1,667,680 0.174	795,039 0.097

Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the destination x year level, and given in parantheses. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, and * significant at 10%.

Volume: Higher import intensity \Rightarrow lower exports

- 10% depreciation: Highly import intensive exporters raise their exports significantly less (numerically, by 0.7pp (1st-order), 1.5pp (2nd-order), 2.4pp (3rd-order), respectively).

Dependent variable: Log-change in export volume ($\Delta V_{t,i,k,t}$)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
$\Delta ER_{k,t}^*$ First-order Import Intensity	-0.0794	-0.0548	-0.1582	-0.2843***	-0.2161**
	(0.0940)	(0.0942)	(0.0982)	(0.1031)	(0.0990)
Δ ER _{k,t} * Export Market Share	-0.3409**	-0.6384***	-0.6003***	-0.5993***	-0.2931*
	(0.1495)	(0.1801)	(0.1799)	(0.1799)	(0.1509)
$\Delta ER_{k,t}^*$ Second-order Import Intensity			-0.8094***	-0.7258***	-0.7058***
			(0.1639)	(0.1582)	(0.1512)
$\Delta ER_{k,t}$ * Third-order Import Intensity				-3.6736***	-4.3251***
				(0.7412)	(0.7224)
Δ ER _{kt}	-0.1484				0.1828*
	(0.0974)				(0.0980)
Destination x Sector and Year FE	Yes				Yes
Destination x Sector x Year FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Observations	3,237,893	3,237,893	3,237,893	3,237,893	3,237,893
R-squared	0.061	0.138	0.138	0.139	0.062

Volume: Robustness

- Strongly robust in all dimensions.
- except for exports to the Euro-area countries (price pass-through \checkmark , volume pass-through \otimes).

Specification:	Baseline	Weighted LS	$\begin{array}{l} \text{Time-varying} \\ \text{Import Intensity} \\ (\ \vartheta_f \equiv \vartheta_{f,t} \) \end{array}$	Wholesale Traders (Emp < 10)	Main Export Products	High Quality Products	Bilateral Exchange Rate	CN 4-digit	Euro-area countries
Dependent variable: Log-change in export volume ($\Delta V_{f,i,k,t}$)	(0)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\Delta \text{ER}_{k,t}^{*}$ First-order Import Intensity	-0.2843***	-0.3236***	-0.0376	-0.6317**	-0.2262**	-0.3391**	-0.1746	-0.1664	0.1501
	(0.1031)	(0.1027)	(0.0914)	(0.2463)	(0.1052)	(0.1380)	(0.1117)	(0.1485)	(0.2472)
$\Delta \text{ER}_{k,t}^{} ^{*}$ Export Market Share	-0.5993***	-0.4808***	-0.6227***	-0.8999**	-0.3902**	-0.7803***	-0.3173*	-0.5873***	-0.8881****
	(0.1799)	(0.1677)	(0.1811)	(0.4151)	(0.1797)	(0.2540)	(0.1780)	(0.2274)	(0.2623)
$\Delta \text{ER}_{k,t}^{*}$ Second-order Import Intensity	-0.7258***	-0.6874***	-0.3925***	-0.8587***	-0.6604***	-0.675***	-0.3130*	-0.5248**	0.1403
	(0.1582)	(0.1558)	(0.1372)	(0.2709)	(0.1754)	(0.2021)	(0.1740)	(0.2233)	(0.2855)
$\Delta \text{ER}_{k,t}^{}^{*}$ Third-order Import Intensity	-3.6736***	-4.0968***	-0.3874	-5.0012***	-3.909***	-3.0497***	-2.6204***	-0.8207	0.0888
	(0.7412)	(0.7378)	(0.5029)	(0.9909)	(0.8199)	(0.8976)	(0.9348)	(0.8259)	(1.5244)
Destination x Sector x Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,237,893	3,237,893	3,237,893	937,670	2,386,320	1,549,541	3,237,893	1,973,063	785,801
R-squared	0.139	0.142	0.138	0.178	0.148	0.166	0.139	0.134	0.048

Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the destination x year level, and given in parantheses. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, and * significant at 10%.

 Recall: 10% depreciation: Highly import intensive exporters raise their exports significantly less (numerically, by 0.7pp (1st-order), 1.5pp (2nd-order), 2.4pp (3rd-order), respectively).

- Recall: 10% depreciation: Highly import intensive exporters raise their exports significantly less (numerically, by 0.7pp (1st-order), 1.5pp (2nd-order), 2.4pp (3rd-order), respectively).
- Following an ER depreciation, lower demand by high import-intensity exporters for inputs?, or potentially abrupt increase in marginal costs for more import-intensive suppliers?

Supply chain disruptions?

Import-intensive exporters have fewer suppliers (1.4%↓), fewer new suppliers (3.3%↓), greater number of lost suppliers (3.1%↑), following a 10% currency depreciation.

Dependent variable:	∆ Log(Number of Suppliers)	Log(Number of New Suppliers)	Log(Number of Lost Suppliers)
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\Delta \text{ ER}_t * \text{ First-order Import Intensity}$	-0.3025*** (0.0690)	-0.7336***	0.6679***
	(0.0090)	(0.1095)	(0.0007)
$\Delta \text{ER}_t ^\star$ Second-order Import Intensity	-0.4212*** (0.1102)	-0.9874*** (0.1801)	0.2965** (0.1408)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	171,006	171,006	171,006
R-squared	0.092	0.095	0.164

Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the firm level, and given in parantheses. All columns include the levels of firstand second-order import intensities. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, and * significant at 10%.

Supply chain disruptions?

- Import-intensive exporters have fewer suppliers (1.4%↓), fewer new suppliers (3.3%↓), greater number of lost suppliers (3.1%↑), following a 10% currency depreciation.
- Exporters with import-intensive suppliers: (1.1%↓), (2.6%↓), (0.8%↑).

Dependent variable:	Δ Log(Number of Suppliers)	Log(Number of New Suppliers)	Log(Number of Lost Suppliers)
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\Delta ER_t * First-order Import Intensity$	-0.3025***	-0.7336***	0.6679***
	(0.0690)	(0.1095)	(0.0867)
$\Delta ER_t * Second-order Import Intensity$	-0.4212***	-0.9874***	0.2965**
	(0.1102)	(0.1801)	(0.1408)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	171,006	171,006	171,006
R-squared	0.092	0.095	0.164

Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the firm level, and given in parantheses. All columns include the levels of firstand second-order import intensities. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, and * significant at 10%.

Market Power within the Domestic Supply Network

Further Discussions: Market Power within Domestic Supply Network

1 Higher reliance on a single supplier $\leftrightarrow \rightarrow$ weaker bargaining power of exporter f on the supplier L (L: the largest supplier)

$$\mathcal{C}_{f,t} = \frac{\text{Purchased Value}_{L,f,t}}{\text{Supplier Purchases}_{f,t}}$$

2 Lower monopsony power ↔ weaker bargaining power of exporter f on the supplier L

$$\mathcal{M}_{f,t} = \frac{\text{Firm-to-firm Sales}_{L,f,t}}{\sum_{f' \in F} \text{Firm-to-firm Sales}_{L,f',t}}$$

We expect

- Higher reliance on a single supplier \implies higher pass-through
- Lower monopsony power => higher pass-through

Further Discussions: Market Power within Domestic Supply Network

 Import-intensive exporters work with many suppliers, and have a lower monopsony power.

Cross	Corre	lations

	Import Intensity	Export Market Share	Supplier Concentration	Monopsony
Import Intensity	1			
Export Market Share	0.1038***	1		
Supplier Concentration	-0.3163***	-0.0010*	1	
Monopsony	-0.0527***	0.0225***	0.3082***	1

Further Discussions: Market Power within Domestic Supply Network (Export Price)

- Higher reliance on a single supplier \implies higher pass-through
- Higher monopsony power --+ lower pass-through

Dependent variable: Log-change in export price ($\Delta P_{t,i,k,t}$)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\Delta ER_{k_1}^*$ Supplier Concentration,	0.1155***	0.1152***	0.1220***	0.1215***
	(0.0135)	(0.0136)	(0.0147)	(0.0147)
ΔER_{k1}^{*} Monopsony,			-0.0207	-0.0199
n ₄ s v v s			(0.0143)	(0.0143)
Δ ER _{k,t} * First-order Import Intensity	0.1777***	0.1885***	0.1796***	0.1900***
	(0.0252)	(0.0264)	(0.0252)	(0.0264)
$\Delta ER_{k,t}^{*}$ Export Market Share	0.0732***	0.0732***	0.0749***	0.0748***
	(0.0251)	(0.0251)	(0.0249)	(0.0249)
$\Delta ER_{k,t}$ * Second-order Import Intensity	0.1041***	0.0980***	0.1001***	0.0944***
	(0.0323)	(0.0318)	(0.0324)	(0.0318)
$\Delta \mbox{ ER}_{k,t}^{*}$ Third-order Import Intensity		0.3170**		0.3106**
		(0.1363)		(0.1361)
Destination x Sector x Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,234,860	3,234,860	3,234,860	3,234,860
R-squared	0.106	0.106	0.106	0.106

Further Discussions: Market Power within Domestic Supply Network (Export Volume)

No significant effect of domestic market power on the export volume.Our key results remain intact.

Dependent variable: Log-change in export volume ($\Delta V_{t,i,k,t}$)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\Delta ER_{k,t}$ * Supplier Concentration	0.0855	0.0847	0.0811	0.0834
	(0.0608)	(0.0606)	(0.0711)	(0.0707)
$\Delta ER_{k,t}$ * Monopsony			0.0014 (0.0858)	-0.0079 (0.0852)
$\Delta ER_{k,t}$ * First-order Import Intensity	-0.0934	-0.2075*	-0.1007	-0.2141*
	(0.1089)	(0.1143)	(0.1091)	(0.1147)
$\Delta ER_{k,t}$ * Export Market Share	-0.5973***	-0.5966***	-0.5965***	-0.5951***
	(0.1798)	(0.1799)	(0.1783)	(0.1785)
Δ ERk,t * Second-order Import Intensity	-0.7972***	-0.7255***	-0.7939***	-0.7236***
	(0.1601)	(0.1545)	(0.1600)	(0.1551)
$\Delta ER_{k,t}$ * Third-order Import Intensity		-3.2967***		-3.3072***
		(0.7425)		(0.7358)
Destination x Sector x Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,234,860	3,234,860	3,234,860	3,234,860
R-squared	0.139	0.139	0.139	0.139

Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the destination x year level, and given in parantheses. ***

Conclusion

A domestic currency depreciation \Rightarrow lower export prices, higher exports ? Not strongly so.

- Almost all exporters import.
- Their import intensity doubles, once we take into account their domestic supply network.

Following an ER depreciation, exporters ...

- cannot offer competitive prices,
- cannot raise their exports,
- experience greater supply chain disruptions.

to the extent they, or their suppliers, rely on imports.

Policy should keep an eye on exporters' <u>direct and indirect</u> reliance on imports as a hurdle to overcome for harnessing the benefit of an ER depreciation on exports.

Export Pass-Through, Imported Inputs and Domestic Supply Networks

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